Other than going through a chroot ssh howto with you, how about
restricting what the remote users can do by using AppArmor? You can
whitelist everything you want the binary to do...
On 4/30/08, Mark Richards <
mark.richards@...> wrote:
> This is probably basic, but I have done my RTFM work for the day and
> cannot seem to get past this one.
>
> We use dropbear client on some remote machines (running very automated
> stuff). We run ssh on our server and do NOT allow telnet logins (port
> 23) nor do we support password authentication per se. This closes, in
> our view, some commonly exploited security worries.
>
> Each remote site has a unique RSA certificate and a home directory.
> Each remote site uses dbclient as the transport where dbclient is used
> by scp for getting and putting files in specific subdirectories off the
> home directory on the server.
>
> By sheer accident (testing by initiating a shell using dbclient) I
> discovered that I could cd /... cd /var/.. etc. In some cases I could
> even read and write files!!!
>
> Not what we had intended. Now we have n number of sites out there, all
> having nice keys into the production server where some hack can do who
> knows what. Scary part is we don't know what the impacts may be, yet.
>
> My (stupid?) assumption was that a given user logging in via ssh would
> be limited to their /home directory. Not so. Apparently any user
> coming in via an ssh certificate assigned to a specific user can still
> grope around, and if files/(directories) have world access, they can play.
>
> We tried a little trick: rc in the user's home/.ssh directory, containing:
>
> /usr/sbin/chroot .
>
> However it appears chroot cannot be executed by other than.. root!
>
> So, long-winded, but how might we accomplish the following:
>
> 1. Limit users to their home directory only
> 2. Allow users enough access so they can perform scp operations in their
> home directory and subdirectories off of it, and
> 3. Allow users to delete a file (after an scp get). This last one seems
> like it's suited for a shell operation but since the remotes are
> automated, it might be impossible.
>
> Any unix/linux file system folks out there care to chime in? Public
> whipping will be tolerated in order that we learn :)
>
>
>
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