Quantum Immortality = no second law

[nichomachus]

In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
decay does not occur.

On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.

This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.
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[Saibal Mitra-2]

Citeren nichomachus <Steven.Payne.Long@...>:

>
> In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
> physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
> upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
> material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
> the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
> time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
> decay does not occur.

This has never been rigorously proven. I can give you some argumetns
why the MWI does not imply Quantum Immortality.

>
> On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
> which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
> since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
> result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
> observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.
>
> This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.

This is also not a correct conclusion (if you replace MWI by quantum
immortality).


> >
>



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[Saibal Mitra-2]

Citeren nichomachus <Steven.Payne.Long@...>:

>
> In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
> physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
> upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
> material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
> the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
> time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
> decay does not occur.

This has never been rigorously proven. I can give you some argumetns
why the MWI does not imply Quantum Immortality.

>
> On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
> which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
> since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
> result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
> observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.
>
> This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.

This is also not a correct conclusion (if you replace MWI by quantum
immortality).


> >
>



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[Michael Rosefield-2]

No, it just means no-one's put enough stress on the 2nd Law yet :)

Besides, it's not so much a law as a guideline. Well, a strong statistical tendency....

On 15/04/2008, nichomachus <Steven.Payne.Long@...> wrote:

In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
decay does not occur.

On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.

This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

On 15/04/2008, Michael Rosefield <rosyatrandom@...> wrote:
> No, it just means no-one's put enough stress on the 2nd Law yet :)
>
> Besides, it's not so much a law as a guideline. Well, a strong statistical
> tendency....

As Michael pointed out, the 2nd law is a statistical law, which says
that a decrease in entropy is unlikely, not impossible.. QTI predicts
that you will survive the most probable way possible. This means it is
unlikely that you will find yourself in a world where you choose to
attempt quantum suicide experiments in the first place, but if you do
the least improbable way of surviving is very improbable in absolute
terms, but not impossible.



--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Russell Standish-2]

Further to this, to say that the 2nd law is falsified, we'd have to
have circumstances where the less likely outcome ocurred more
frequently than the more often. (ie entropy decreases more often than
it increases). But this begs the question of what we mean by
likelihood of outcome, if not related to frequency of occurrence.

In any case, QTI does not change the observed outcome of likely versus
unlikely events, it just changes the set of possible outcome on which
to apply the second law.

On Tue, Apr 15, 2008 at 11:30:05AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> On 15/04/2008, Michael Rosefield <rosyatrandom@...> wrote:
> > No, it just means no-one's put enough stress on the 2nd Law yet :)
> >
> > Besides, it's not so much a law as a guideline. Well, a strong statistical
> > tendency....
>
> As Michael pointed out, the 2nd law is a statistical law, which says
> that a decrease in entropy is unlikely, not impossible.. QTI predicts
> that you will survive the most probable way possible. This means it is
> unlikely that you will find yourself in a world where you choose to
> attempt quantum suicide experiments in the first place, but if you do
> the least improbable way of surviving is very improbable in absolute
> terms, but not impossible.
>
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>

--

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[nichomachus]

On Apr 14, 9:21 pm, Russell Standish <li...@...> wrote:
> Further to this, to say that the 2nd law is falsified, we'd have to
> have circumstances where the less likely outcome ocurred more
> frequently than the more often. (ie entropy decreases more often than
> it increases). But this begs the question of what we mean by
> likelihood of outcome, if not related to frequency of occurrence.

Hi, Russell,

Surely the framework of the Many Worlds interpretation would say that
the likelyhood of measuring a quantum observable in state A rather
than B reflects the number of histories in which the observable is
measured as being in state A divided by number of histories in which
either is seen. Molecules in a gas chamber may not be the best
example, as I am personally unclear as to whether the macroscopic
behavior of the aggregate is reduceable to probabilistic quantum
events. But the point remains that it is impossible to adhere to the
MWI without also affirming not only the existence of histories in
which unlikely events happen, but also ones in which *only* unlikely
events happen. This includes universes where the cat never dies,
uranium never decays, and (perhaps) the second law does not hold. Is
it right to think that this is unproblematic? Or perhaps we should
regard the Many Worlds formalism as merely an instrumentalistic
interpretation, similar to how Bohr and Heisenberg regarded their
Copenhagen interpretation, rather than granting full ontological
significance to alternate possible histories.

>
> In any case, QTI does not change the observed outcome of likely versus
> unlikely events, it just changes the set of possible outcome on which
> to apply the second law.

What does QTI stand for?

So our suicidal physicist would have enabled himself to observe the
extremely scenario of seeing radioactive elements never decay, by
killing himself in all histories where decay ocurred and thereby
selecting only the ones where it did not take place to continue his
awareness in.Of course, those branches of his identity would still
have observed the same outcomes even if the gun was unloaded, so he
doesn't really have to kill himself in nearly all universes in order
to get to see it.

But if I accept the above as true, then I must also accept that there
are histories that have been experienced in which no atom of an
unstable element has decayed since Jan. 1, 1900. (or any date you
prefer)

When Thomas Young performed his double slit experiment, were there any
versions of himself that did not observe an interference pattern?

Why not?

I appreciate the replies as I am more questions than answers at this
point on these topics.

>
> On Tue, Apr 15, 2008 at 11:30:05AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > On 15/04/2008, Michael Rosefield <rosyatran...@...> wrote:
> > > No, it just means no-one's put enough stress on the 2nd Law yet :)
>
> > > Besides, it's not so much a law as a guideline. Well, a strong statistical
> > > tendency....
>
> > As Michael pointed out, the 2nd law is a statistical law, which says
> > that a decrease in entropy is unlikely, not impossible.. QTI predicts
> > that you will survive the most probable way possible. This means it is
> > unlikely that you will find yourself in a world where you choose to
> > attempt quantum suicide experiments in the first place, but if you do
> > the least improbable way of surviving is very improbable in absolute
> > terms, but not impossible.
>
> > --
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> --
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------­-
> A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone [phone] (mobile)
> Mathematics                              
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> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------­-- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

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[nichomachus]

On Apr 14, 6:26 pm, Saibal Mitra <smi...@...> wrote:

> Citeren nichomachus <Steven.Payne.L...@...>:
>
>
>
> > In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
> > physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
> > upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
> > material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
> > the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
> > time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
> > decay does not occur.
>
> This has never been rigorously proven. I can give you some argumetns
> why the MWI does not imply Quantum Immortality.

Ok. I would like to hear them.

>
>
>
> > On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
> > which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
> > since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
> > result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
> > observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.
>
> > This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.
>
> This is also not a correct conclusion (if you replace MWI by quantum
> immortality).

I agree. I don't believe the argument truly works whether we are
talking about WMI or quantum immortality. But what I am interested in
is why not. That is why I posed the argument. If it is flawed, it will
help me understand everything better if you could tell me how you
think it is flawed. First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply
quamtum immortality?
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[Russell Standish-2]

On Mon, Apr 14, 2008 at 10:24:12PM -0700, nichomachus wrote:

> Hi, Russell,
>
> Surely the framework of the Many Worlds interpretation would say that
> the likelyhood of measuring a quantum observable in state A rather
> than B reflects the number of histories in which the observable is
> measured as being in state A divided by number of histories in which
> either is seen. Molecules in a gas chamber may not be the best
> example, as I am personally unclear as to whether the macroscopic
> behavior of the aggregate is reduceable to probabilistic quantum
> events. But the point remains that it is impossible to adhere to the
> MWI without also affirming not only the existence of histories in
> which unlikely events happen, but also ones in which *only* unlikely
> events happen.

Absolutely - there are histories in which entropy decreases
continuously. This doesn't contradict the second law, because the
second law is probabilistic. Many, many more histories exist with
increasing entropy than decreasing entropy. The chance of an observer
observing continuous decrease in entropy is negligible, but small
exceptions to the second law can be observed in our world. IIRC, some guys
at ANU showed this a few years back, which got a bit of press,
although its not surprising when you understand what the second law
really is - I think it was Ken Baldwin's group, but you can try Google
for details.

> This includes universes where the cat never dies,
> uranium never decays, and (perhaps) the second law does not hold. Is
> it right to think that this is unproblematic?

Yes.

> Or perhaps we should
> regard the Many Worlds formalism as merely an instrumentalistic
> interpretation, similar to how Bohr and Heisenberg regarded their
> Copenhagen interpretation, rather than granting full ontological
> significance to alternate possible histories.
>

I take the Many Worlds as ontologically significant, unlike Bohr or Heisenberg.

> >
> > In any case, QTI does not change the observed outcome of likely versus
> > unlikely events, it just changes the set of possible outcome on which
> > to apply the second law.
>
> What does QTI stand for?
>

Quantum Theory of Immortality. What you are talking about with
Tegmark's suicide experiment.

> So our suicidal physicist would have enabled himself to observe the
> extremely scenario of seeing radioactive elements never decay, by
> killing himself in all histories where decay ocurred and thereby
> selecting only the ones where it did not take place to continue his
> awareness in.Of course, those branches of his identity would still
> have observed the same outcomes even if the gun was unloaded, so he
> doesn't really have to kill himself in nearly all universes in order
> to get to see it.
>
> But if I accept the above as true, then I must also accept that there
> are histories that have been experienced in which no atom of an
> unstable element has decayed since Jan. 1, 1900. (or any date you
> prefer)
>

Yes.

> When Thomas Young performed his double slit experiment, were there any
> versions of himself that did not observe an interference pattern?
>

Probably. There were others where his apparatus blew up, or a cat peed
on a vital component and so on.

> Why not?
>
> I appreciate the replies as I am more questions than answers at this
> point on these topics.
>

--

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[Saibal Mitra]

> First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply
>quantum immortality?

MWI is just quantum mechanics without the wavefunction collapse postulate.
This then implies that after a measurement your wavefuntion will be in a
superposition of the states corresponding to definite outcomes. But we
cannot just consider suicide experiments and then say that just because
branches of the wavefuntion exist in which I survive, I'll find myself there
with 100% probability. The fact that probabilities are conserved follows
from unitary time evolution. If a state evolves into a linear combination of
states in which I'm dead and alive then the probabilities of all these
states add up to 1. The probability of finding myself to be alive at all
after the experiment is then less than the probability of me finding myself
about to perform the suicide experiment.

The probability of me finding myself to be alive after n suicide experiments
decays exponentially with n. Therefore I should not expect to find myself
having survived many suicide experiments. Note that contrary to what you
often read in the popular accounts of the multiverse, the multiverse does
not split when we make observations. The most natural state for the entire
multiverse is just an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. The energy can be taken
to be zero, therefore the wavefunction of the multiverse satisfies the
equation:

H|psi> = 0

And |psi> is thus stationary. We can say that the multiverse is timeless.

Now, we find ourselves to be in some sector of the multiverse that is
clearly not stationary. For any person, you can consider an operator (let's
call it A) that will answer the question: Is this person present in our
universe? This operator has two eigenvalues: 0 (the person is  not present),
1 (the person is present).  You can then split the Hilbert space into two
sectors that are mapped to zero and 1 respectively (the two eigenspaces of
A). If the person is present, you can ask more questions about the person.
For each question there is an operator. The simultaneous eigenstates of all
these operators forms a basis of the sector where the person is present. The
basis vectors specify everything there is to know about the person (and
about the rest of the universe).

Let's denote these basis states by |b1>, |b2>, ....|bn>

The probability for the person to be alive at all is:

P_alive = Sum over k of |<psi|bk>|^2

Suppose that you are in state |b1>. The a priori probablity for this is P1 =
|<psi|b1>|^2. Since the multiverse does not evolve in time:

<psi|exp(-i/hbar H t) = <psi|


So:

<psi|b1> = <psi|exp(-i/hbar H t)|b1>

exp(-i/hbar H t)|b1> will be some linear combination of the |bk>'s and
states from the sector in which the person is dead:

exp(-i/hbar H t)|b1> = sum over k of ck |bk> + |dead>

where |dead> satisfies A|dead> = 0



The best way to think about exp(-i/hbar H t)|b1>  is that it is just a
unitary mapping that happens to give the subjective time an observer will
experience in the multiverse which in reality is static. If |b1> happens to
describe the person about to enter a suicide machine, then
|<dead|exp(-i/hbar H t)|b1>|^2 will converge to 1 quite fast. One minus this
probablity is the sum of the |ck|^2 and gives the probability that the
person finds himself alive in a state in which he remebers stepping in the
suicide machine a time t ago. So, that probability tends to zero very fast
as t goes to infinity.


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[Russell Standish-2]

On Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 02:22:23AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:

>
> > First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply
> >quantum immortality?
>
> MWI is just quantum mechanics without the wavefunction collapse postulate.
> This then implies that after a measurement your wavefuntion will be in a
> superposition of the states corresponding to definite outcomes. But we
> cannot just consider suicide experiments and then say that just because
> branches of the wavefuntion exist in which I survive, I'll find myself there
> with 100% probability. The fact that probabilities are conserved follows
> from unitary time evolution. If a state evolves into a linear combination of
> states in which I'm dead and alive then the probabilities of all these
> states add up to 1. The probability of finding myself to be alive at all
> after the experiment is then less than the probability of me finding myself
> about to perform the suicide experiment.
>
> The probability of me finding myself to be alive after n suicide experiments
> decays exponentially with n. Therefore I should not expect to find myself
> having survived many suicide experiments. Note that contrary to what you
> often read in the popular accounts of the multiverse, the multiverse does
> not split when we make observations. The most natural state for the entire
> multiverse is just an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. The energy can be taken
> to be zero, therefore the wavefunction of the multiverse satisfies the
> equation:
>

One should also note that this is the ASSA position. The ASSA was
introduced by Jacques Mallah in his argument against quantum
immortality, and a number of participants in this list adhere to the
ASSA position. Its counterpart if the RSSA, which does imply quantum
immortality (provided that the no cul-de-sac conjecture holds), and
other list participants adhere to the RSSA. To date, no argument has
convincingly demonstrated which of the ASSA or RSSA should be
preferred, so it has become somewhat a matter of taste. There is some
discussion of this in my book "Theory of Nothing".

Cheers

--

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[Bruno Marchal]

Le 16-avr.-08, à 03:24, Russell Standish a écrit :

>
> On Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 02:22:23AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
>>
>>> First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply
>>> quantum immortality?
>>
>> MWI is just quantum mechanics without the wavefunction collapse
>> postulate.
>> This then implies that after a measurement your wavefuntion will be
>> in a
>> superposition of the states corresponding to definite outcomes. But we
>> cannot just consider suicide experiments and then say that just
>> because
>> branches of the wavefuntion exist in which I survive, I'll find
>> myself there
>> with 100% probability. The fact that probabilities are conserved
>> follows
>> from unitary time evolution. If a state evolves into a linear
>> combination of
>> states in which I'm dead and alive then the probabilities of all these
>> states add up to 1. The probability of finding myself to be alive at
>> all
>> after the experiment is then less than the probability of me finding
>> myself
>> about to perform the suicide experiment.
>>
>> The probability of me finding myself to be alive after n suicide
>> experiments
>> decays exponentially with n. Therefore I should not expect to find
>> myself
>> having survived many suicide experiments. Note that contrary to what
>> you
>> often read in the popular accounts of the multiverse, the multiverse
>> does
>> not split when we make observations. The most natural state for the
>> entire
>> multiverse is just an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. The energy can
>> be taken
>> to be zero, therefore the wavefunction of the multiverse satisfies the
>> equation:
>>
>
> One should also note that this is the ASSA position. The ASSA was
> introduced by Jacques Mallah in his argument against quantum
> immortality, and a number of participants in this list adhere to the
> ASSA position. Its counterpart if the RSSA, which does imply quantum
> immortality (provided that the no cul-de-sac conjecture holds), and
> other list participants adhere to the RSSA. To date, no argument has
> convincingly demonstrated which of the ASSA or RSSA should be
> preferred, so it has become somewhat a matter of taste. There is some
> discussion of this in my book "Theory of Nothing".

Actually, I am not sure the ASSA makes sense once we take into account
the distinction between first and third person point of view. Comp
immortality is an almost trivial consequence that personal death cannot
be a first person experience at all. Quantum immortality is most
plausibly equivalent with comp immortality if the "quantum level"
describes our correct comp substitution level. But this does not mean
that we can know what shape the comp immortality can have, given that
comp forbids us to know which machine we are or which computations bear
us. We have not yet answered the question of how many first persons
are. If it is one, amoeba duplication already entails immortality,
although not necessarily a reassuring (or frightening) one like some of
those suggested by some religion or popular beliefs. We are mainly
ignorant of those matters, and necessarily so, in case comp (or its
transfinitely many weakenings) is (are) correct.
But we can make inferences, i.e. theories, and *define* matter by the
explicit addition of the no-cul-de-sac principle, by adding Dt to Bp,
going from the primary hypostases to the secondary one: this gives a
quantum propositional theory of matter but this (lobian) theory is
still in lack of a good tensor product capable of extracting a non
trivial first person *plural* notion. Strictly speaking, it remains
amazing we can interact ...

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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[Bruno Marchal]

I recommend the movie "The prestige". (2006 movie by Christopher Nolan
based on a novel by Christopher Priest).

Simulacron three (the book by Galouye, or "the thirteen floor" movie)
is the best introduction to our general topic (imo), especially through
comp and simulated reality. Matrix and many similar movies or novels
(Blade Runner for example) can be seen in that spirit too.

But "The prestige" got the point, (without hiding the cruelty, and
using "magic" to make communicable the non communicable). "The
prestige" can be seen as a conclusion!  I can hardly add anything. To
see twice!

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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[nichomachus]

The Prestige, with Christian Bale, Hugh Jackman, Michael Caine, Andy
Serkis.... and David Bowie as Nikola Tesla... I also highly recommend
this very entertaining movie that I saw last week.

Unfortunately, Bruno, I don't see the connection between this film and
the computationalist hypothesis.
-steve

On Apr 16, 5:06 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> I recommend the movie "The prestige". (2006 movie by Christopher Nolan
> based on a novel by Christopher Priest).
>
> Simulacron three (the book by Galouye, or "the thirteen floor" movie)
> is the best introduction to our general topic (imo), especially through
> comp and simulated reality. Matrix and many similar movies or novels
> (Blade Runner for example) can be seen in that spirit too.
>
> But "The prestige" got the point, (without hiding the cruelty, and
> using "magic" to make communicable the non communicable). "The
> prestige" can be seen as a conclusion!  I can hardly add anything. To
> see twice!
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[nichomachus]

On Apr 16, 4:54 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> Le 16-avr.-08, à 03:24, Russell Standish a écrit :
> > On Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 02:22:23AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >>> First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply
> >>> quantum immortality?
>
> >> MWI is just quantum mechanics without the wavefunction collapse
> >> postulate.
> >> This then implies that after a measurement your wavefuntion will be
> >> in a
> >> superposition of the states corresponding to definite outcomes. But we
> >> cannot just consider suicide experiments and then say that just
> >> because
> >> branches of the wavefuntion exist in which I survive, I'll find
> >> myself there
> >> with 100% probability. The fact that probabilities are conserved
> >> follows
> >> from unitary time evolution. If a state evolves into a linear
> >> combination of
> >> states in which I'm dead and alive then the probabilities of all these
> >> states add up to 1. The probability of finding myself to be alive at
> >> all
> >> after the experiment is then le