<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:forum-24816</id>
	<title>Nabble - Fedora SELinux List</title>
	<updated>2008-12-02T16:20:33Z</updated>
	<link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.nabble.com/Fedora-SELinux-List-f24816.xml" />
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Fedora-SELinux-List-f24816.html" />
	<subtitle type="html">For discussions about the Fedora SELinux Project.</subtitle>
	
<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20804106</id>
	<title>Re: How can i call a function which is usually used by root?</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T16:20:33Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T16:20:33Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Nifty Fedora Mitch</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">On Tue, Dec 02, 2008 at 05:21:24PM +0800, wk wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;I want write a c program.And a common user(not in root group) will run
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;this program.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;In this program,I call fread(/dev/sdc...) and fwrite(/dev/sdc),but this
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;call will return &amp;quot;permission no allow&amp;quot;.If I use the root user,will be
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;ok.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;How to change to the authority to root's?
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;I know the &amp;nbsp;root's password.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Your best bet is &amp;quot;sudo&amp;quot; or better look at the pairs of tools like:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;/usr/bin/system-config-bind
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;/usr/sbin/system-config-bind
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;They take advantage of &amp;quot;consolehelper&amp;quot; and the commone case that
&lt;br&gt;/usr/sbin is not in the search path of commmon users but /usr/bin is.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Note well, From the man page:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;consolehelper &amp;nbsp;requires that a PAM configuration for every managed pro-
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;gram exist. &amp;nbsp;So to make /sbin/foo or /usr/sbin/foo managed, you need to
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;create &amp;nbsp;a &amp;nbsp;link &amp;nbsp;from /usr/bin/foo to /usr/bin/consolehelper and create
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;the file /etc/pam.d/foo, normally using the pam_console(8) PAM &amp;nbsp;module.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-- 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; T o m &amp;nbsp;M i t c h e l l 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; Found me a new hat, now what?
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20804106&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/How-can-i-call-a-function-which-is-usually-used-by-root--tp20788832p20804106.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20801437</id>
	<title>Re: spamc / spamd communication problem</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T13:32:36Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T13:32:36Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Bob Richmond wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I'm trying to make spamd listen on a unix domain socket, and let spamc
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; connect to it. The question is, I can't figure out the intended
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; destination for the spamd socket file (as specified via --socketpath
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; passed to spamd and -U to spamc). I see that spamc_t has permission to
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; connect to a socket with a type of spamd_tmp_t, but there doesn't appear
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; to be an fc rule for where a new socket file would inherit that type.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; It makes sense to me that the socket file should exist in
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /var/run/spamassassin/spamd.sock to be consistent, but
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /var/run/spamassassin has a type of spamd_var_run_t, where spamc has no
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; permission to connect to a sock_file under. Any help?
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I'm running F10, policy version selinux-policy-targeted-3.5.13-18.fc10.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Thanks!
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; -- 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20801437&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;Currently it is only allowed to connect to a sock file in /tmp,
&lt;br&gt;Although it should be allowed to use /var/run/spamassassin.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I will update policy
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;You can add these rules for now using
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;# grep avc /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol
&lt;br&gt;# semodule -i mypol.pp
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Fixed in selinux-policy-3.5.13-29.fc10
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1qXQACgkQrlYvE4MpobOpNACeOVVplPU+IG9QALu6UdBLUaMw
&lt;br&gt;0GUAoJ+d23rJPHb5LhSzrPTt/DNEZCnH
&lt;br&gt;=HHE9
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20801437&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/spamc---spamd-communication-problem-tp20796579p20801437.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20801211</id>
	<title>Re: selinux denying a cups printer</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T13:21:41Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T13:21:41Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Gene Heskett wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Greetings;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Uptodate F8, targeted setting
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; host=coyote.coyote.den type=AVC msg=audit(1227891049.940:679): avc: denied { 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; execute } for pid=6486 comm=&amp;quot;cupsd&amp;quot; name=&amp;quot;lp3&amp;quot; dev=sda3 ino=104400725 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; tcontext=system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t:s0 tclass=file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; host=coyote.coyote.den type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1227891049.940:679): 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; arch=40000003 syscall=33 success=no exit=-13 a0=bff13656 a1=1 a2=b7f17ff4 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; a3=b7f18a3c items=0 ppid=6485 pid=6486 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=1 comm=&amp;quot;cupsd&amp;quot; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; exe=&amp;quot;/usr/sbin/cupsd&amp;quot; subj=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; The troubleshooters recommended fix is a restorecon -v './lp3'
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; The only ./lp3 I could find was in /etc/cups.d/interfaces/lp3, and while it 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; did change the context of the file, it does not fix the problem. &amp;nbsp;This 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; particular driver ppd is the lpr and cupswrapper of the HL2140 driver kit 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; from Brother, and apparently is installed in a /usr/local/Brother subdir by 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; their rpms.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; All this did work flawlessly before I had a drive failure, and it worked after 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; an Fu8 install, but failed sometime in the nearly 2 weeks uptime, as did all 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; my other printer profiles, which I have now deleted and rebuilt, and work 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; except for this one.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I am going to try touching /.autorelabel and reboot again see if that helps. &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; However, nothing happened the last time I tried that 2 weeks ago...
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp;grep interfaces /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts
&lt;br&gt;/etc/cups/interfaces(/.*)?	system_u:object_r:cupsd_interface_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;chcon -t cupsd_interface_t /etc/cups.d/interfaces/lp3
&lt;br&gt;Should fix it.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1puUACgkQrlYvE4MpobP4agCeOu1UiTOQbStLoXYjuCZ8rVHq
&lt;br&gt;QKgAn0nm7uucimNgultxxSjgtQdKqU1g
&lt;br&gt;=CXYP
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20801211&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/selinux-denying-a-cups-printer-tp20737790p20801211.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20801133</id>
	<title>Re: SELinux is preventing npviewer.bin (nsplugin_t) &quot;read&quot; to	./pulse-shm-4180703699</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T13:17:13Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T13:17:13Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Antonio Olivares wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Dear fellow selinux experts,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Net avc for npviewer :( &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Summary:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; SELinux is preventing npviewer.bin (nsplugin_t) &amp;quot;read&amp;quot; to ./pulse-shm-4180703699
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; (tmpfs_t).
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Detailed Description:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; SELinux denied access requested by npviewer.bin. It is not expected that this
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; access is required by npviewer.bin and this access may signal an intrusion
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; attempt. It is also possible that the specific version or configuration of the
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; application is causing it to require additional access.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Allowing Access:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Sometimes labeling problems can cause SELinux denials. You could try to restore
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; the default system file context for ./pulse-shm-4180703699,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; restorecon -v './pulse-shm-4180703699'
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; If this does not work, there is currently no automatic way to allow this access.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Instead, you can generate a local policy module to allow this access - see FAQ
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; (&lt;a href=&quot;http://fedora.redhat.com/docs/selinux-faq-fc5/#id2961385&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://fedora.redhat.com/docs/selinux-faq-fc5/#id2961385&lt;/a&gt;) Or you can disable
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; SELinux protection altogether. Disabling SELinux protection is not recommended.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Please file a bug report (&lt;a href=&quot;http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/enter_bug.cgi&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/enter_bug.cgi&lt;/a&gt;)
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; against this package.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Additional Information:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;unconfined_u:unconfined_r:nsplugin_t:s0-s0:c0.c102
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 3
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;unconfined_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target Objects &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;./pulse-shm-4180703699 [ file ]
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;npviewer.bin
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source Path &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Port &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;Unknown&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Host &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;riohigh
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; nspluginwrapper-1.1.4-1.fc11
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Policy RPM &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;selinux-policy-3.5.13-18.fc10
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Selinux Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Policy Type &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; targeted
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; MLS Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Enforcing Mode &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Enforcing
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Plugin Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; catchall_file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Host Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; riohigh
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Platform &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Linux riohigh 2.6.27.5-117.fc10.i686 #1 SMP Tue
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; Nov 18 12:19:59 EST 2008 i686 athlon
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Alert Count &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 1
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; First Seen &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Tue 02 Dec 2008 06:57:09 AM CST
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Last Seen &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; Tue 02 Dec 2008 06:57:09 AM CST
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Local ID &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;c049e765-9d3b-4384-927a-19797fb78d8d
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Line Numbers &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Raw Audit Messages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; node=riohigh type=AVC msg=audit(1228222629.565:217): avc: &amp;nbsp;denied &amp;nbsp;{ read } for &amp;nbsp;pid=4625 comm=&amp;quot;npviewer.bin&amp;quot; name=&amp;quot;pulse-shm-4180703699&amp;quot; dev=tmpfs ino=36988 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:nsplugin_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 tclass=file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; node=riohigh type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1228222629.565:217): arch=40000003 syscall=5 success=no exit=-13 a0=bfda08d0 a1=a0000 a2=0 a3=bfda08d0 items=0 ppid=4427 pid=4625 auid=500 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=(none) ses=13 comm=&amp;quot;npviewer.bin&amp;quot; exe=&amp;quot;/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin&amp;quot; subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:nsplugin_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I try the fix and i get:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; [olivares@riohigh ~]$ su -
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Password: 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; [root@riohigh ~]# restorecon -v './pulse-shm-4180703699'
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; restorecon: &amp;nbsp;stat error on ./pulse-shm-4180703699: &amp;nbsp;No such file or directory
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; [root@riohigh ~]# 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Thanks,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Antonio 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; --
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20801133&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;This one has me baffled, on how you created this file. &amp;nbsp;This file should
&lt;br&gt;be labeled user_tmpfs_t in which case nsplugin would have been allowed
&lt;br&gt;to use it, &amp;nbsp;But for some reason it got created with the incorrect context.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Could you try to upgrade to the latest policy and see if this still happens.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I tried an experiment as the unconfined user
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;# mount -t tmpfs_t /dev/shm /mnt
&lt;br&gt;# ls -ldZ /mnt/redhat/
&lt;br&gt;drwxrwxrwt &amp;nbsp;root root staff_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;/mnt/redhat/
&lt;br&gt;# touch /mnt/redhat/test
&lt;br&gt;# ls -lZ /mnt/redhat/test
&lt;br&gt;- -rw-r--r-- &amp;nbsp;root root staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s0 /mnt/redhat/test
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Which is what pulseaudio should have done.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Could you check what context pulseaudio is running with
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;# ps -eZ | grep pulse
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1pdkACgkQrlYvE4MpobNjawCg6EmpLWaQNOK9ndoYgD8GN4TV
&lt;br&gt;HG8AoNJIqutO0vFPPa1tjRW+gLk2V9WU
&lt;br&gt;=L/DR
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20801133&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/SELinux-is-preventing-npviewer.bin-%28nsplugin_t%29-%22read%22-to-.-pulse-shm-4180703699-tp20791612p20801133.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20800741</id>
	<title>Re: iptables denials on Centos</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T12:56:05Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T12:56:05Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Tony Molloy wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Hi,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I'm running several fully updated CentOS 5.2 servers and am trying to get all 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; the SELinux denials sorted out.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Here are two of the ones that I've got left. I can generate local policy to 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; allow these but is that the best way. The full sealert messages have been 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; cut.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 1. &amp;nbsp;SELinux is preventing iptables (iptables_t) &amp;quot;read write&amp;quot; to socket
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;(initrc_t). For complete SELinux messages. run sealert -l
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;80760bb0-da8f-4fe8-855a-1cfc5789a597
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;/div&gt;This is most likely a leaked file descriptor from the tool that is
&lt;br&gt;launching iptables, you can safely add this
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; [root@garryowen ~]# sealert -l 80760bb0-da8f-4fe8-855a-1cfc5789a597
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Summary:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; SELinux is preventing iptables (iptables_t) &amp;quot;read write&amp;quot; to socket (initrc_t).
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Detailed Description:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; SELinux denied access requested by iptables. It is not expected that this 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;...
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Allowing Access:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; You can generate a local policy module to allow this access - see FAQ
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;...
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Additional Information:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;system_u:system_r:iptables_t
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;system_u:system_r:initrc_t
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target Objects &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;socket [ packet_socket ]
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;iptables
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source Path &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; /sbin/iptables
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Port &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;Unknown&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Host &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;garryowen.xx.xx.xx
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; iptables-1.3.5-4.el5
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Policy RPM &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;selinux-policy-2.4.6-137.1.el5
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Selinux Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Policy Type &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; targeted
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; MLS Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Enforcing Mode &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Permissive
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Plugin Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; catchall
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Host Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; garryowen.xx.xx.xx
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Platform &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Linux garryowen.xx.xx.xx 2.6.18-92.1.18.el5
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Raw Audit Messages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=AVC msg=audit(1227684250.838:20268): avc: &amp;nbsp;denied &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; { read write } for &amp;nbsp;pid=22829 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; path=&amp;quot;socket:[18015]&amp;quot; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; dev=sockfs ino=18015 scontext=system_u:system_r:iptables_t:s0 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; tcontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=packet_socket
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1227684250.838:20268): 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; arch=40000003 syscall=11 success=yes exit=0 a0=9c95470 a1=9c956f8 a2=9c95610 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; a3=40 items=0 ppid=5571 pid=22829 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; exe=&amp;quot;/sbin/iptables&amp;quot; subj=system_u:system_r:iptables_t:s0 key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 2. SELinux is preventing iptables (iptables_t) &amp;quot;read&amp;quot; to pipe (crond_t). For
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; complete SELinux messages. run sealert -l
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 879c2152-44ee-4594-96c6-96716fda722b
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; [root@garryowen ~]# &amp;nbsp;sealert -l 879c2152-44ee-4594-96c6-96716fda722b
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Summary:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; SELinux is preventing iptables (iptables_t) &amp;quot;read&amp;quot; to pipe (crond_t).
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Detailed Description:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; SELinux denied access requested by iptables. It is not expected that this 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;...
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Allowing Access:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; You can generate a local policy module to allow this access - see FAQ
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;...
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Additional Information:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;root:system_r:iptables_t
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;system_u:system_r:crond_t:SystemLow-SystemHigh
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target Objects &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;pipe [ fifo_file ]
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;iptables
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source Path &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; /sbin/iptables
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Port &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;Unknown&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Host &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;garryowen.xx.xx.xx
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Source RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; iptables-1.3.5-4.el5
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Target RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Policy RPM &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;selinux-policy-2.4.6-137.1.el5
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Selinux Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Policy Type &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; targeted
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; MLS Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Enforcing Mode &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Permissive
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Plugin Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; catchall
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Host Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; garryowen.xx.xx.xx
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Platform &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Linux garryowen.xx.xx.xx 2.6.18-92.1.18.el5
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Raw Audit Messages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=AVC msg=audit(1228007101.709:31231): avc: &amp;nbsp;denied &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; { read } for &amp;nbsp;pid=14428 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; path=&amp;quot;pipe:[1462004]&amp;quot; dev=pipefs 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; ino=1462004 scontext=root:system_r:iptables_t:s0 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; tcontext=system_u:system_r:crond_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=fifo_file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=AVC msg=audit(1228007101.709:31231): avc: &amp;nbsp;denied &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; { write } for &amp;nbsp;pid=14428 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; path=&amp;quot;pipe:[1462005]&amp;quot; dev=pipefs 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; ino=1462005 scontext=root:system_r:iptables_t:s0 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; tcontext=system_u:system_r:crond_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=fifo_file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1228007101.709:31231): 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; arch=40000003 syscall=11 success=yes exit=0 a0=9985ab8 a1=9985698 a2=996d5d0 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; a3=0 items=0 ppid=14416 pid=14428 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=5147 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; exe=&amp;quot;/sbin/iptables&amp;quot; subj=root:system_r:iptables_t:s0 key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Thanks,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Tony
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; --
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800741&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;This is also a leaked file descriptor which can be added.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;You should grab the latest preview selinux-policy
&lt;br&gt;selinux-policy-2.4.6-197.el5
&lt;br&gt;for RHEL5.3 and try it out, it has lots of fixes.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1oOUACgkQrlYvE4MpobM5+ACglHd6Oiag5uR7maY9CpDSNJMd
&lt;br&gt;UCEAnRtRSwjGNA5cEkNK3sLavhSrWrZa
&lt;br&gt;=zWKP
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800741&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/iptables-denials-on-Centos-tp20788882p20800741.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20800660</id>
	<title>Re: nspluginwrapper and .PDF files</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T12:52:28Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T12:52:28Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Paul C. Rauser wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Over the past several days, I have begin to experiment with enabling the allow_unconfined_nsplugin_transition boolean in a F10 test environment.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; One of the most consistent demands from my test users/potential security threats is the ability to open .PDF files. &amp;nbsp;Using mozplugger to do this launches evince, which throws AVCs all over and is probably undesirable anyway for the reasons listed in Dan Walsh's Nov 4 blog post on &lt;a href=&quot;http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; On the other hand, removing mozplugger and using the Adobe Acrobat 8.1.3 Firefox plugin throws lots of AVCs of its own -- and even more when doing things like printing -- and thus may not be the way to go.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; If allow_unconfined_nsplugin_transition is to be useful in user land, it seems that the boolean should allow .PDF opening/saving/printing out of the box using either evince or Adobe's reader. &amp;nbsp;I am happy to bugzilla the AVCs for one or the other and help with testing -- any preference in the community for which one?
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Paul C. Rauser 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; ægis law group LLP 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 901 F Street, N.W. 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Suite 500 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Washington, D.C. 20004 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; T: 202 737 3375 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; F: 202 737 3330 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; E: &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800660&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;prauser@...&lt;/a&gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; NOTICE: This communication from Aegis Law Group LLP may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential, or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete all copies. 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; --
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800660&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;Make sure your home directory is properly labeled and install the latest
&lt;br&gt;selinux policy. &amp;nbsp;selinux-policy-3.5.13-26
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;# yum upgrade selinux-policy\* --enablerepo=updates-testing
&lt;br&gt;# restorecon -R -v /home
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1oAwACgkQrlYvE4MpobOw3QCfbqFd/HMm3xMIRSoluXuAhexM
&lt;br&gt;6v0AniFlrcR/+fOy1SkbvBoLjh8H4G94
&lt;br&gt;=eCmI
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800660&amp;i=2&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/nspluginwrapper-and-.PDF-files-tp20783030p20800660.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20800623</id>
	<title>Re: interface file</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T12:50:24Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T12:50:24Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Konrad Azzopardi wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; hi there,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; A simple question - if i want to create some interface like
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; corenet_tcp_connect_yule_port(), would it be ok to put it in the
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; interface file cause i saw a lot of similar macros depracated inside
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; the interface files ?. If it is not the right place, would the
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; corenetwork.if.in be the right place ? what is the best way to go
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; about it ? tnx a lot
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; --
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800623&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;Usually these rules go into the upstream package. &amp;nbsp;So I would submit
&lt;br&gt;your package for upstream acceptance, but you can put any interface into
&lt;br&gt;the if file.
&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1n5AACgkQrlYvE4MpobOMaQCfVHHCuCt+ebQNO8kJSdOEkUJ1
&lt;br&gt;bPEAn2L6q6vSSHe9kYnoi047ptqWYxL+
&lt;br&gt;=Fh1Z
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800623&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/interface-file-tp20782382p20800623.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20800595</id>
	<title>Re: Problem with restorecon</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T12:49:19Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T12:49:19Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Konrad Azzopardi wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Hi people,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; i have the following policy version &amp;nbsp;installed
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; selinux-policy-3.3.1-107.fc9.noarch
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; selinux-policy-devel-3.3.1-107.fc9.noarch
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; selinux-policy-targeted-3.3.1-107.fc9.noarch
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I create an Selinux policy and generated the following filecontexts
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; [root@MALTA konsu]# semanage fcontext -l | grep yule
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /etc/init.d/yule &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; regular file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; system_u:object_r:yule_script_exec_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /var/run/yule.pid &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;regular file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; system_u:object_r:yule_var_run_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /var/log/yule(/.*)? &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;regular file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; system_u:object_r:yule_log_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /var/lib/yule(/.*)? &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;regular file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; system_u:object_r:yule_var_lib_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /etc/yulerc &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;regular file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; system_u:object_r:yule_config_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /usr/local/sbin/yule &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; regular file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; system_u:object_r:yule_exec_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Allt he files seems to become labelled normally as expected except
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; /etc/init.d/yule
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; [root@MALTA konsu]# restorecon -R -v /etc/init.d/yule
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; [root@MALTA konsu]# ls -lrtZ /etc/init.d/yule
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; -rwx------ &amp;nbsp;root root system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t:s0 /etc/init.d/yule
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I cannot get rid of initrc_exec_t. Although my script is still
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; confined correctly, I would like to label this file normally, is there
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; a reason why restorecon fails ?
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; many thanks
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; konrad
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; --
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800595&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;Make sure you escape the &amp;quot;.&amp;quot;s &amp;nbsp;The regular expression matching does not
&lt;br&gt;always work as expected.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;/etc/init\.d/yule &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; regular file
&lt;br&gt;system_u:object_r:yule_script_exec_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1n08ACgkQrlYvE4MpobM2wwCePyFIGH8o2ZstmxdYFJ5eXE2r
&lt;br&gt;vFIAoKv7XAslgUGEs0Rc27TnLMFPBzs0
&lt;br&gt;=Q+CX
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800595&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Problem-with-restorecon-tp20782358p20800595.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20800230</id>
	<title>Re: Setroubleshootd on FC8 has a major memory leak</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T12:28:16Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T12:28:16Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;spo wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Hello,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; after 9 days of running it used over 2G (virt, rss ~1G).
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Greetings,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Edek
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; -- 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800230&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;Try this.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;# service setroubleshoot stop
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;/var/lib/setroubleshoot/audit_listener_database.xml
&lt;br&gt;# service setroubleshoot start
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I think your problem is the xml database has grown too large. &amp;nbsp;Newer
&lt;br&gt;versions of setroubleshoot only allow 50 AVCs.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1mmAACgkQrlYvE4MpobOXPQCg0SN2R317vRM0hYOD5eb7RbCV
&lt;br&gt;HGcAoJnDjUJgWY3xy7q6Pz3IASUiHNXD
&lt;br&gt;=bfgP
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800230&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Setroubleshootd-on-FC8-has-a-major-memory-leak-tp20730516p20800230.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20800180</id>
	<title>Re: preventing unconfined users exec in home and tmp</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T12:25:38Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T12:25:38Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Murray McAllister wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Murray McAllister wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Hi,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; I have turned &amp;quot;allow_unconfined_exec_content&amp;quot; off, but unconfined
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; users (unconfined_u) can still execute files in their home directories
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; and /tmp/.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; I tried adding a user with &amp;quot;useradd -Z unconfined_u&amp;quot;. This user can
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; still execute. I could not find any dontaudit rules.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Am I missing something?
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I am running Fedora release 10 (Cambridge):
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; selinux-policy-targeted-3.5.13-18.fc10.noarch
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; selinux-policy-3.5.13-18.fc10.noarch
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; selinux-policy-doc-3.5.13-18.fc10.noarch
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; libselinux-utils-2.0.73-1.fc10.i386
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; libselinux-python-2.0.73-1.fc10.i386
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; libselinux-2.0.73-1.fc10.i386
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; policycoreutils-2.0.57-11.fc10.i386
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Cheers.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; -- 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800180&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;Yes this boolean really should not exist, it is caused by calling an
&lt;br&gt;interface. &amp;nbsp;that allows PARAM to execute user_home_t, but unconfiened_t
&lt;br&gt;can already execute any file on the system so the boolean has no effect.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp;The boolean only works for confined users.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkk1mcIACgkQrlYvE4MpobNI9gCglCtb/KiWAJGUW5Batvngsf3e
&lt;br&gt;dQQAnRsPCndAvOw7o3ADhFL89qZq3fDI
&lt;br&gt;=rUbd
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800180&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/preventing-unconfined-users-exec-in-home-and-tmp-tp20692972p20800180.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20800412</id>
	<title>Re: Problem with restorecon</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T12:20:41Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T12:20:41Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Konrad Azzopardi</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Believe it or not, a reboot fixed it, and this is not windows :)
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;On Tue, Dec 2, 2008 at 12:03 AM, Bruno Wolff III &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800412&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;bruno@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; On Mon, Dec 01, 2008 at 23:47:04 +0100,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp;Konrad Azzopardi &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800412&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;konrad.azzopardi@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; I cannot get rid of initrc_exec_t. Although my script is still
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; confined correctly, I would like to label this file normally, is there
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; a reason why restorecon fails ?
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; My guess would be that the last matching rule for /etc/init.d/yule is not
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; the one you have shown.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; As far as I can tell the management of rules for restorecon is not complete
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; as there isn't any easy way to order the rules.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; For add on rules you can delete existing ones and re-add them to put them
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; at the end of the list. That is a pain.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I don't think a list of re's matching complete paths that is order dependent
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; is the best way to solve this problem. I think it would be better to have
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; something that matched the tree structure of the file system.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20800412&amp;i=2&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Problem-with-restorecon-tp20782358p20800412.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20796579</id>
	<title>spamc / spamd communication problem</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T09:05:38Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T09:05:38Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Bob Richmond</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">I'm trying to make spamd listen on a unix domain socket, and let spamc 
&lt;br&gt;connect to it. The question is, I can't figure out the intended 
&lt;br&gt;destination for the spamd socket file (as specified via --socketpath 
&lt;br&gt;passed to spamd and -U to spamc). I see that spamc_t has permission to 
&lt;br&gt;connect to a socket with a type of spamd_tmp_t, but there doesn't appear 
&lt;br&gt;to be an fc rule for where a new socket file would inherit that type.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;It makes sense to me that the socket file should exist in 
&lt;br&gt;/var/run/spamassassin/spamd.sock to be consistent, but 
&lt;br&gt;/var/run/spamassassin has a type of spamd_var_run_t, where spamc has no 
&lt;br&gt;permission to connect to a sock_file under. Any help?
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I'm running F10, policy version selinux-policy-targeted-3.5.13-18.fc10.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Thanks!
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20796579&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/spamc---spamd-communication-problem-tp20796579p20796579.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20794555</id>
	<title>Re: How can i call a function which is usually used by root?</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T07:31:54Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T07:31:54Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Serge E. Hallyn</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Quoting wk (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20794555&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;304702903@...&lt;/a&gt;):
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I want write a c program.And a common user(not in root group) will run this program.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp;In this program,I call fread(/dev/sdc...) and fwrite(/dev/sdc),but this call will return &amp;quot;permission no allow&amp;quot;.If I use the root user,will be ok.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp;How to change to the authority to root's?
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp;I know the &amp;nbsp;root's password.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Offhand I suspect what you need is CAP_SYS_RAWIO (maybe CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
&lt;br&gt;But I don't know how your program is designed so am not sure how to
&lt;br&gt;best give your program that privilege:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 1. Make program setuid root, have it immediately switch
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;to nonroot and keep root in your saved uid so you can move it
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;back to euid when you need to write /dev/sdc.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;(man setresuid)
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 2. Put CAP_SYS_RAWIO in fP (or fI if you can put it in
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;the calling user's pI), then have your program
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;put the capability into pE just when it needs to
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;write to /dev/sdc.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;(man 7 capabilities)
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 3. Write a separate minimal partially privileged helper
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;program which answers requests by your main program.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Then you could use selinux to enforce an assured
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;pipeline to prevent anyone else using the helper.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;(google privilege separation)
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-serge
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20794555&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/How-can-i-call-a-function-which-is-usually-used-by-root--tp20788832p20794555.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20791612</id>
	<title>SELinux is preventing npviewer.bin (nsplugin_t) &quot;read&quot; to ./pulse-shm-4180703699</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T04:59:16Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T04:59:16Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Antonio Olivares</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Dear fellow selinux experts,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Net avc for npviewer :( &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Summary:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;SELinux is preventing npviewer.bin (nsplugin_t) &amp;quot;read&amp;quot; to ./pulse-shm-4180703699
&lt;br&gt;(tmpfs_t).
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Detailed Description:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;SELinux denied access requested by npviewer.bin. It is not expected that this
&lt;br&gt;access is required by npviewer.bin and this access may signal an intrusion
&lt;br&gt;attempt. It is also possible that the specific version or configuration of the
&lt;br&gt;application is causing it to require additional access.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Allowing Access:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Sometimes labeling problems can cause SELinux denials. You could try to restore
&lt;br&gt;the default system file context for ./pulse-shm-4180703699,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;restorecon -v './pulse-shm-4180703699'
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;If this does not work, there is currently no automatic way to allow this access.
&lt;br&gt;Instead, you can generate a local policy module to allow this access - see FAQ
&lt;br&gt;(&lt;a href=&quot;http://fedora.redhat.com/docs/selinux-faq-fc5/#id2961385&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://fedora.redhat.com/docs/selinux-faq-fc5/#id2961385&lt;/a&gt;) Or you can disable
&lt;br&gt;SELinux protection altogether. Disabling SELinux protection is not recommended.
&lt;br&gt;Please file a bug report (&lt;a href=&quot;http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/enter_bug.cgi&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/enter_bug.cgi&lt;/a&gt;)
&lt;br&gt;against this package.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Additional Information:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Source Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;unconfined_u:unconfined_r:nsplugin_t:s0-s0:c0.c102
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 3
&lt;br&gt;Target Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;unconfined_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;Target Objects &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;./pulse-shm-4180703699 [ file ]
&lt;br&gt;Source &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;npviewer.bin
&lt;br&gt;Source Path &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin
&lt;br&gt;Port &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;Unknown&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;Host &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;riohigh
&lt;br&gt;Source RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; nspluginwrapper-1.1.4-1.fc11
&lt;br&gt;Target RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;Policy RPM &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;selinux-policy-3.5.13-18.fc10
&lt;br&gt;Selinux Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;Policy Type &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; targeted
&lt;br&gt;MLS Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;Enforcing Mode &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Enforcing
&lt;br&gt;Plugin Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; catchall_file
&lt;br&gt;Host Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; riohigh
&lt;br&gt;Platform &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Linux riohigh 2.6.27.5-117.fc10.i686 #1 SMP Tue
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; Nov 18 12:19:59 EST 2008 i686 athlon
&lt;br&gt;Alert Count &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 1
&lt;br&gt;First Seen &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Tue 02 Dec 2008 06:57:09 AM CST
&lt;br&gt;Last Seen &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; Tue 02 Dec 2008 06:57:09 AM CST
&lt;br&gt;Local ID &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;c049e765-9d3b-4384-927a-19797fb78d8d
&lt;br&gt;Line Numbers &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Raw Audit Messages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;node=riohigh type=AVC msg=audit(1228222629.565:217): avc: &amp;nbsp;denied &amp;nbsp;{ read } for &amp;nbsp;pid=4625 comm=&amp;quot;npviewer.bin&amp;quot; name=&amp;quot;pulse-shm-4180703699&amp;quot; dev=tmpfs ino=36988 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:nsplugin_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 tclass=file
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;node=riohigh type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1228222629.565:217): arch=40000003 syscall=5 success=no exit=-13 a0=bfda08d0 a1=a0000 a2=0 a3=bfda08d0 items=0 ppid=4427 pid=4625 auid=500 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=(none) ses=13 comm=&amp;quot;npviewer.bin&amp;quot; exe=&amp;quot;/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin&amp;quot; subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:nsplugin_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I try the fix and i get:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[olivares@riohigh ~]$ su -
&lt;br&gt;Password: 
&lt;br&gt;[root@riohigh ~]# restorecon -v './pulse-shm-4180703699'
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;restorecon: &amp;nbsp;stat error on ./pulse-shm-4180703699: &amp;nbsp;No such file or directory
&lt;br&gt;[root@riohigh ~]# 
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Thanks,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Antonio 
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20791612&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/SELinux-is-preventing-npviewer.bin-%28nsplugin_t%29-%22read%22-to-.-pulse-shm-4180703699-tp20791612p20791612.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20791472</id>
	<title>Re: installing xine from source yields lots of selinux denials</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T04:50:34Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T04:50:34Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Antonio Olivares</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">--- On Tue, 12/2/08, Rahul Sundaram &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20791472&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;sundaram@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; From: Rahul Sundaram &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20791472&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;sundaram@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Subject: Re: installing xine from source yields lots of selinux denials
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; To: &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20791472&amp;i=2&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;olivares14031@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Cc: &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20791472&amp;i=3&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Date: Tuesday, December 2, 2008, 2:44 AM
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Antonio Olivares wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; Dear all,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; Trying to install xine-lib from source *to put in the
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; missing pieces* gives selinux denials with chcon
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; It would be much simpler to install xine-lib-extras from
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; rpmfusion.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Rahul
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;Done!!!
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I got it from rpmfusion. &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Regards,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Antonio
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20791472&amp;i=4&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/installing-xine-from-source-yields-lots-of-selinux-denials-tp20559940p20791472.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20789789</id>
	<title>Re: installing xine from source yields lots of selinux denials</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T02:44:48Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T02:44:48Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>rahulsundaram</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Antonio Olivares wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Dear all,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Trying to install xine-lib from source *to put in the missing pieces* gives selinux denials with chcon
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;It would be much simpler to install xine-lib-extras from rpmfusion.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Rahul
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20789789&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/installing-xine-from-source-yields-lots-of-selinux-denials-tp20559940p20789789.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20788882</id>
	<title>iptables denials on Centos</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T01:39:16Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T01:39:16Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Tony Molloy</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">&lt;br&gt;Hi,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I'm running several fully updated CentOS 5.2 servers and am trying to get all 
&lt;br&gt;the SELinux denials sorted out.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Here are two of the ones that I've got left. I can generate local policy to 
&lt;br&gt;allow these but is that the best way. The full sealert messages have been 
&lt;br&gt;cut.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;1. &amp;nbsp;SELinux is preventing iptables (iptables_t) &amp;quot;read write&amp;quot; to socket
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;(initrc_t). For complete SELinux messages. run sealert -l
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;80760bb0-da8f-4fe8-855a-1cfc5789a597
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[root@garryowen ~]# sealert -l 80760bb0-da8f-4fe8-855a-1cfc5789a597
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Summary:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;SELinux is preventing iptables (iptables_t) &amp;quot;read write&amp;quot; to socket (initrc_t).
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Detailed Description:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;SELinux denied access requested by iptables. It is not expected that this 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;...
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Allowing Access:
&lt;br&gt;You can generate a local policy module to allow this access - see FAQ
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;...
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Additional Information:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Source Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;system_u:system_r:iptables_t
&lt;br&gt;Target Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;system_u:system_r:initrc_t
&lt;br&gt;Target Objects &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;socket [ packet_socket ]
&lt;br&gt;Source &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;iptables
&lt;br&gt;Source Path &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; /sbin/iptables
&lt;br&gt;Port &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;Unknown&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;Host &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;garryowen.xx.xx.xx
&lt;br&gt;Source RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; iptables-1.3.5-4.el5
&lt;br&gt;Target RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;Policy RPM &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;selinux-policy-2.4.6-137.1.el5
&lt;br&gt;Selinux Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;Policy Type &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; targeted
&lt;br&gt;MLS Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;Enforcing Mode &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Permissive
&lt;br&gt;Plugin Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; catchall
&lt;br&gt;Host Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; garryowen.xx.xx.xx
&lt;br&gt;Platform &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Linux garryowen.xx.xx.xx 2.6.18-92.1.18.el5
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Raw Audit Messages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=AVC msg=audit(1227684250.838:20268): avc: &amp;nbsp;denied &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;{ read write } for &amp;nbsp;pid=22829 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; path=&amp;quot;socket:[18015]&amp;quot; 
&lt;br&gt;dev=sockfs ino=18015 scontext=system_u:system_r:iptables_t:s0 
&lt;br&gt;tcontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=packet_socket
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1227684250.838:20268): 
&lt;br&gt;arch=40000003 syscall=11 success=yes exit=0 a0=9c95470 a1=9c956f8 a2=9c95610 
&lt;br&gt;a3=40 items=0 ppid=5571 pid=22829 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 
&lt;br&gt;fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; 
&lt;br&gt;exe=&amp;quot;/sbin/iptables&amp;quot; subj=system_u:system_r:iptables_t:s0 key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;2. SELinux is preventing iptables (iptables_t) &amp;quot;read&amp;quot; to pipe (crond_t). For
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; complete SELinux messages. run sealert -l
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 879c2152-44ee-4594-96c6-96716fda722b
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[root@garryowen ~]# &amp;nbsp;sealert -l 879c2152-44ee-4594-96c6-96716fda722b
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Summary:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;SELinux is preventing iptables (iptables_t) &amp;quot;read&amp;quot; to pipe (crond_t).
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Detailed Description:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;SELinux denied access requested by iptables. It is not expected that this 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;...
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Allowing Access:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;You can generate a local policy module to allow this access - see FAQ
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;...
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Additional Information:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Source Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;root:system_r:iptables_t
&lt;br&gt;Target Context &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;system_u:system_r:crond_t:SystemLow-SystemHigh
&lt;br&gt;Target Objects &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;pipe [ fifo_file ]
&lt;br&gt;Source &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;iptables
&lt;br&gt;Source Path &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; /sbin/iptables
&lt;br&gt;Port &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;Unknown&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;Host &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;garryowen.xx.xx.xx
&lt;br&gt;Source RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; iptables-1.3.5-4.el5
&lt;br&gt;Target RPM Packages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; 
&lt;br&gt;Policy RPM &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;selinux-policy-2.4.6-137.1.el5
&lt;br&gt;Selinux Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;Policy Type &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; targeted
&lt;br&gt;MLS Enabled &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; True
&lt;br&gt;Enforcing Mode &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Permissive
&lt;br&gt;Plugin Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; catchall
&lt;br&gt;Host Name &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; garryowen.xx.xx.xx
&lt;br&gt;Platform &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;Linux garryowen.xx.xx.xx 2.6.18-92.1.18.el5
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Raw Audit Messages &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=AVC msg=audit(1228007101.709:31231): avc: &amp;nbsp;denied &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;{ read } for &amp;nbsp;pid=14428 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; path=&amp;quot;pipe:[1462004]&amp;quot; dev=pipefs 
&lt;br&gt;ino=1462004 scontext=root:system_r:iptables_t:s0 
&lt;br&gt;tcontext=system_u:system_r:crond_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=fifo_file
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=AVC msg=audit(1228007101.709:31231): avc: &amp;nbsp;denied &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;{ write } for &amp;nbsp;pid=14428 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; path=&amp;quot;pipe:[1462005]&amp;quot; dev=pipefs 
&lt;br&gt;ino=1462005 scontext=root:system_r:iptables_t:s0 
&lt;br&gt;tcontext=system_u:system_r:crond_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=fifo_file
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;host=garryowen.xx.xx.xx type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1228007101.709:31231): 
&lt;br&gt;arch=40000003 syscall=11 success=yes exit=0 a0=9985ab8 a1=9985698 a2=996d5d0 
&lt;br&gt;a3=0 items=0 ppid=14416 pid=14428 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 
&lt;br&gt;egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=5147 comm=&amp;quot;iptables&amp;quot; 
&lt;br&gt;exe=&amp;quot;/sbin/iptables&amp;quot; subj=root:system_r:iptables_t:s0 key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Thanks,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Tony
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20788882&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/iptables-denials-on-Centos-tp20788882p20788882.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20788832</id>
	<title>How can i call a function which is usually used by root?</title>
	<published>2008-12-02T01:21:24Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-02T01:21:24Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>wk-4</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">I want write a c program.And a common user(not in root group) will run this program.&lt;br&gt;
In this program,I call fread(/dev/sdc...) and fwrite(/dev/sdc),but this
call will return &quot;permission no allow&quot;.If I use the root user,will be
ok.&lt;br&gt;
How to change to the authority to root's?&lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
I know the&amp;nbsp; root's password.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20788832&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/How-can-i-call-a-function-which-is-usually-used-by-root--tp20788832p20788832.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20782619</id>
	<title>Re: Problem with restorecon</title>
	<published>2008-12-01T15:03:03Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-01T15:03:03Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Bruno Wolff III</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">On Mon, Dec 01, 2008 at 23:47:04 +0100,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; Konrad Azzopardi &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20782619&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;konrad.azzopardi@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I cannot get rid of initrc_exec_t. Although my script is still
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; confined correctly, I would like to label this file normally, is there
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; a reason why restorecon fails ?
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;My guess would be that the last matching rule for /etc/init.d/yule is not
&lt;br&gt;the one you have shown.
&lt;br&gt;As far as I can tell the management of rules for restorecon is not complete
&lt;br&gt;as there isn't any easy way to order the rules.
&lt;br&gt;For add on rules you can delete existing ones and re-add them to put them
&lt;br&gt;at the end of the list. That is a pain.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I don't think a list of re's matching complete paths that is order dependent
&lt;br&gt;is the best way to solve this problem. I think it would be better to have
&lt;br&gt;something that matched the tree structure of the file system.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20782619&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Problem-with-restorecon-tp20782358p20782619.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20782382</id>
	<title>interface file</title>
	<published>2008-12-01T14:48:49Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-01T14:48:49Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Konrad Azzopardi</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">hi there,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;A simple question - if i want to create some interface like
&lt;br&gt;corenet_tcp_connect_yule_port(), would it be ok to put it in the
&lt;br&gt;interface file cause i saw a lot of similar macros depracated inside
&lt;br&gt;the interface files ?. If it is not the right place, would the
&lt;br&gt;corenetwork.if.in be the right place ? what is the best way to go
&lt;br&gt;about it ? tnx a lot
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20782382&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/interface-file-tp20782382p20782382.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20782358</id>
	<title>Problem with restorecon</title>
	<published>2008-12-01T14:47:04Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-01T14:47:04Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Konrad Azzopardi</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Hi people,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;i have the following policy version &amp;nbsp;installed
&lt;br&gt;selinux-policy-3.3.1-107.fc9.noarch
&lt;br&gt;selinux-policy-devel-3.3.1-107.fc9.noarch
&lt;br&gt;selinux-policy-targeted-3.3.1-107.fc9.noarch
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I create an Selinux policy and generated the following filecontexts
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[root@MALTA konsu]# semanage fcontext -l | grep yule
&lt;br&gt;/etc/init.d/yule &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; regular file
&lt;br&gt;system_u:object_r:yule_script_exec_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;/var/run/yule.pid &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;regular file
&lt;br&gt;system_u:object_r:yule_var_run_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;/var/log/yule(/.*)? &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;regular file
&lt;br&gt;system_u:object_r:yule_log_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;/var/lib/yule(/.*)? &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;regular file
&lt;br&gt;system_u:object_r:yule_var_lib_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;/etc/yulerc &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;regular file
&lt;br&gt;system_u:object_r:yule_config_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;/usr/local/sbin/yule &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; regular file
&lt;br&gt;system_u:object_r:yule_exec_t:s0
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Allt he files seems to become labelled normally as expected except
&lt;br&gt;/etc/init.d/yule
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[root@MALTA konsu]# restorecon -R -v /etc/init.d/yule
&lt;br&gt;[root@MALTA konsu]# ls -lrtZ /etc/init.d/yule
&lt;br&gt;-rwx------ &amp;nbsp;root root system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t:s0 /etc/init.d/yule
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I cannot get rid of initrc_exec_t. Although my script is still
&lt;br&gt;confined correctly, I would like to label this file normally, is there
&lt;br&gt;a reason why restorecon fails ?
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;many thanks
&lt;br&gt;konrad
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20782358&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Problem-with-restorecon-tp20782358p20782358.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20783030</id>
	<title>nspluginwrapper and .PDF files</title>
	<published>2008-12-01T14:32:09Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-01T14:32:09Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Paul C. Rauser</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Over the past several days, I have begin to experiment with enabling the allow_unconfined_nsplugin_transition boolean in a F10 test environment.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;One of the most consistent demands from my test users/potential security threats is the ability to open .PDF files. &amp;nbsp;Using mozplugger to do this launches evince, which throws AVCs all over and is probably undesirable anyway for the reasons listed in Dan Walsh's Nov 4 blog post on &lt;a href=&quot;http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;On the other hand, removing mozplugger and using the Adobe Acrobat 8.1.3 Firefox plugin throws lots of AVCs of its own -- and even more when doing things like printing -- and thus may not be the way to go.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;If allow_unconfined_nsplugin_transition is to be useful in user land, it seems that the boolean should allow .PDF opening/saving/printing out of the box using either evince or Adobe's reader. &amp;nbsp;I am happy to bugzilla the AVCs for one or the other and help with testing -- any preference in the community for which one?
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Paul C. Rauser 
&lt;br&gt;ægis law group LLP 
&lt;br&gt;901 F Street, N.W. 
&lt;br&gt;Suite 500 
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Washington, D.C. 20004 
&lt;br&gt;T: 202 737 3375 
&lt;br&gt;F: 202 737 3330 
&lt;br&gt;E: &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20783030&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;prauser@...&lt;/a&gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;NOTICE: This communication from Aegis Law Group LLP may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential, or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete all copies. 
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20783030&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/nspluginwrapper-and-.PDF-files-tp20783030p20783030.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20780216</id>
	<title>Re: browser_confine_xguest</title>
	<published>2008-12-01T12:48:16Z</published>
	<updated>2008-12-01T12:48:16Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>John Griffiths-2</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">&lt;!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC &quot;-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN&quot;&gt;
&lt;html&gt;
&lt;head&gt;
&lt;/head&gt;
&lt;body bgcolor=&quot;#ffffff&quot; text=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
The name/ usage of browser_confine_xguest is a bit confusing and
system-config-selinux does not give any enlightenment.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
It may not even matter since I do not have xguest installed, but for
academic purposes, does browser_confine_xguest confine the xguest to
only browsing the localhost if it is on or off? Dan Walsh's journal
seems to indicate that this should be on to allow browsing of the
Internet by xguest which would seem to be the opposite of confine.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;This indicates whether the xguest account will transition
to
xguest_mozilla_t or not.&amp;nbsp; If you turn this boolean on, xguest will be
able to browse the web using firefox/mozilla.&amp;nbsp; If you turn it off the
account will only be allowed to run mozilla/firefox locally.&amp;nbsp; You will
not have any access to the net. --
&lt;a class=&quot;moz-txt-link-freetext&quot; href=&quot;http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/13376.html&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/13376.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
Am I just reading this wrong?&lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Regards,&lt;br&gt;
John&lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/body&gt;
&lt;/html&gt;

&lt;br /&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20780216&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Re%3A-browser_confine_xguest-tp20780216p20780216.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20738100</id>
	<title>Re: selinux denying a cups printer [followup]</title>
	<published>2008-11-28T09:33:53Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-28T09:33:53Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Gene Heskett</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">On Friday 28 November 2008, Gene Heskett wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;Greetings;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;Uptodate F8, targeted setting
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;host=coyote.coyote.den type=AVC msg=audit(1227891049.940:679): avc: denied {
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;execute } for pid=6486 comm=&amp;quot;cupsd&amp;quot; name=&amp;quot;lp3&amp;quot; dev=sda3 ino=104400725
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;tcontext=system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t:s0 tclass=file
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;host=coyote.coyote.den type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1227891049.940:679):
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;arch=40000003 syscall=33 success=no exit=-13 a0=bff13656 a1=1 a2=b7f17ff4
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;a3=b7f18a3c items=0 ppid=6485 pid=6486 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=1 comm=&amp;quot;cupsd&amp;quot;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;exe=&amp;quot;/usr/sbin/cupsd&amp;quot; subj=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;The troubleshooters recommended fix is a restorecon -v './lp3'
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;The only ./lp3 I could find was in /etc/cups.d/interfaces/lp3, and while it
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;did change the context of the file, it does not fix the problem. &amp;nbsp;This
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;particular driver ppd is the lpr and cupswrapper of the HL2140 driver kit
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;from Brother, and apparently is installed in a /usr/local/Brother subdir by
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;their rpms.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;All this did work flawlessly before I had a drive failure, and it worked
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; after an Fu8 install, but failed sometime in the nearly 2 weeks uptime, as
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; did all my other printer profiles, which I have now deleted and rebuilt,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; and work except for this one.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;I am going to try touching /.autorelabel and reboot again see if that helps.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;However, nothing happened the last time I tried that 2 weeks ago...
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;The autorelabel was done, but it didn't help.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-- 
&lt;br&gt;Cheers, Gene
&lt;br&gt;&amp;quot;There are four boxes to be used in defense of liberty:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp;soap, ballot, jury, and ammo. Please use in that order.&amp;quot;
&lt;br&gt;-Ed Howdershelt (Author)
&lt;br&gt;Anyone can hold the helm when the sea is calm.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp; -- Publius Syrus
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20738100&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/selinux-denying-a-cups-printer-tp20737790p20738100.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20737790</id>
	<title>selinux denying a cups printer</title>
	<published>2008-11-28T09:06:31Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-28T09:06:31Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Gene Heskett</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Greetings;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Uptodate F8, targeted setting
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;host=coyote.coyote.den type=AVC msg=audit(1227891049.940:679): avc: denied { 
&lt;br&gt;execute } for pid=6486 comm=&amp;quot;cupsd&amp;quot; name=&amp;quot;lp3&amp;quot; dev=sda3 ino=104400725 
&lt;br&gt;scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 
&lt;br&gt;tcontext=system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t:s0 tclass=file
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;host=coyote.coyote.den type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1227891049.940:679): 
&lt;br&gt;arch=40000003 syscall=33 success=no exit=-13 a0=bff13656 a1=1 a2=b7f17ff4 
&lt;br&gt;a3=b7f18a3c items=0 ppid=6485 pid=6486 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 
&lt;br&gt;fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=1 comm=&amp;quot;cupsd&amp;quot; 
&lt;br&gt;exe=&amp;quot;/usr/sbin/cupsd&amp;quot; subj=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 
&lt;br&gt;key=(null)
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The troubleshooters recommended fix is a restorecon -v './lp3'
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The only ./lp3 I could find was in /etc/cups.d/interfaces/lp3, and while it 
&lt;br&gt;did change the context of the file, it does not fix the problem. &amp;nbsp;This 
&lt;br&gt;particular driver ppd is the lpr and cupswrapper of the HL2140 driver kit 
&lt;br&gt;from Brother, and apparently is installed in a /usr/local/Brother subdir by 
&lt;br&gt;their rpms.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;All this did work flawlessly before I had a drive failure, and it worked after 
&lt;br&gt;an Fu8 install, but failed sometime in the nearly 2 weeks uptime, as did all 
&lt;br&gt;my other printer profiles, which I have now deleted and rebuilt, and work 
&lt;br&gt;except for this one.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I am going to try touching /.autorelabel and reboot again see if that helps. &amp;nbsp;
&lt;br&gt;However, nothing happened the last time I tried that 2 weeks ago...
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-- 
&lt;br&gt;Cheers, Gene
&lt;br&gt;&amp;quot;There are four boxes to be used in defense of liberty:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp;soap, ballot, jury, and ammo. Please use in that order.&amp;quot;
&lt;br&gt;-Ed Howdershelt (Author)
&lt;br&gt;Q:	How many IBM CPU's does it take to do a logical right shift?
&lt;br&gt;A:	33. &amp;nbsp;1 to hold the bits and 32 to push the register.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20737790&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/selinux-denying-a-cups-printer-tp20737790p20737790.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20730516</id>
	<title>Setroubleshootd on FC8 has a major memory leak</title>
	<published>2008-11-28T00:24:18Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-28T00:24:18Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>spo-2</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Hello,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;after 9 days of running it used over 2G (virt, rss ~1G).
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Greetings,
&lt;br&gt;Edek
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20730516&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Setroubleshootd-on-FC8-has-a-major-memory-leak-tp20730516p20730516.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20710699</id>
	<title>Re: How to HTTP Serve Fedora Distribution</title>
	<published>2008-11-26T14:57:28Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-26T14:57:28Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>David Highley</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">&amp;quot;Murray McAllister wrote:&amp;quot;
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; David Highley wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; How can we set up HTTP serving of Fedora distribution since we can not
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; label the files in the ISO? What we have tried:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; - copy ISO file into web tree
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; - loopback mount the ISO to /mnt
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; - symlink /mnt into the web tree
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; or
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; - create directory in web tree
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; - loopback mount the ISO to directory in web tree
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; Selinux blocks access to the distribution. The only solution we are
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; aware of is to drop the pants on selinux by going to permissive mode.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; David Highley
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; --
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20710699&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Hi,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Paul seemed to have answered your question. There are some examples of 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; overriding SELinux contexts with the mount command here:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://docs.fedoraproject.org/selinux-user-guide/f10/en-US/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Mounting_File_Systems.html&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://docs.fedoraproject.org/selinux-user-guide/f10/en-US/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Mounting_File_Systems.html&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Hope that helps,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Cheers.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;Yes, Paul did answer my question. We were not aware that options had
&lt;br&gt;been added to the mount command.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20710699&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/How-to-HTTP-Serve-Fedora-Distribution-tp20703269p20710699.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20703371</id>
	<title>Re: How to HTTP Serve Fedora Distribution</title>
	<published>2008-11-26T07:39:33Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-26T07:39:33Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Paul Howarth</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">David Highley wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; How can we set up HTTP serving of Fedora distribution since we can not
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; label the files in the ISO? What we have tried:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; - copy ISO file into web tree
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; - loopback mount the ISO to /mnt
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; - symlink /mnt into the web tree
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; or
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; - create directory in web tree
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; - loopback mount the ISO to directory in web tree
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Selinux blocks access to the distribution. The only solution we are
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; aware of is to drop the pants on selinux by going to permissive mode.
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;I put the ISO file in my web tree and loopback mount it with a context 
&lt;br&gt;option, e.g. in fstab:
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;/srv/nb/distros/fc10/os/x86_64/iso/Fedora-10-x86_64-DVD.iso 
&lt;br&gt;/srv/nb/distros/fc10/os/x86_64/dvd iso9660 
&lt;br&gt;_netdev,ro,loop,fscontext=system_u:object_r:public_content_t:s0 0 0
&lt;br&gt;/srv/nb/distros/fc10/os/i386/iso/Fedora-10-i386-DVD.iso 
&lt;br&gt;/srv/nb/distros/fc10/os/i386/dvd iso9660 
&lt;br&gt;_netdev,ro,loop,fscontext=system_u:object_r:public_content_t:s0 0 0
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The resulting hierarchy can be exported using ftp, http, rsync, samba, etc.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Paul.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20703371&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/How-to-HTTP-Serve-Fedora-Distribution-tp20703269p20703371.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20703269</id>
	<title>How to HTTP Serve Fedora Distribution</title>
	<published>2008-11-26T07:33:31Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-26T07:33:31Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>David Highley</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">How can we set up HTTP serving of Fedora distribution since we can not
&lt;br&gt;label the files in the ISO? What we have tried:
&lt;br&gt;- copy ISO file into web tree
&lt;br&gt;- loopback mount the ISO to /mnt
&lt;br&gt;- symlink /mnt into the web tree
&lt;br&gt;or
&lt;br&gt;- create directory in web tree
&lt;br&gt;- loopback mount the ISO to directory in web tree
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Selinux blocks access to the distribution. The only solution we are
&lt;br&gt;aware of is to drop the pants on selinux by going to permissive mode.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;David Highley
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20703269&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/How-to-HTTP-Serve-Fedora-Distribution-tp20703269p20703269.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20693101</id>
	<title>Re: preventing unconfined users exec in home and tmp</title>
	<published>2008-11-25T17:23:43Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-25T17:23:43Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Murray McAllister</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Murray McAllister wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Hi,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I have turned &amp;quot;allow_unconfined_exec_content&amp;quot; off, but unconfined users 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; (unconfined_u) can still execute files in their home directories and /tmp/.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I tried adding a user with &amp;quot;useradd -Z unconfined_u&amp;quot;. This user can 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; still execute. I could not find any dontaudit rules.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Am I missing something?
&lt;br&gt;I am running Fedora release 10 (Cambridge):
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;selinux-policy-targeted-3.5.13-18.fc10.noarch
&lt;br&gt;selinux-policy-3.5.13-18.fc10.noarch
&lt;br&gt;selinux-policy-doc-3.5.13-18.fc10.noarch
&lt;br&gt;libselinux-utils-2.0.73-1.fc10.i386
&lt;br&gt;libselinux-python-2.0.73-1.fc10.i386
&lt;br&gt;libselinux-2.0.73-1.fc10.i386
&lt;br&gt;policycoreutils-2.0.57-11.fc10.i386
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Cheers.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20693101&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/preventing-unconfined-users-exec-in-home-and-tmp-tp20692972p20693101.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20692972</id>
	<title>preventing unconfined users exec in home and tmp</title>
	<published>2008-11-25T17:11:48Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-25T17:11:48Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Murray McAllister</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">Hi,
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I have turned &amp;quot;allow_unconfined_exec_content&amp;quot; off, but unconfined users 
&lt;br&gt;(unconfined_u) can still execute files in their home directories and /tmp/.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I tried adding a user with &amp;quot;useradd -Z unconfined_u&amp;quot;. This user can 
&lt;br&gt;still execute. I could not find any dontaudit rules.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Am I missing something?
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Thanks.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20692972&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/preventing-unconfined-users-exec-in-home-and-tmp-tp20692972p20692972.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20664619</id>
	<title>Re: Which permission to execute a script?</title>
	<published>2008-11-24T08:43:10Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-24T08:43:10Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Bruno Wolff III</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 10:40:56 -0500,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp; Daniel J Walsh &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20664619&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;dwalsh@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; A couple of things, people have asked for the ability to stop the
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; execution of programs in the homedir. &amp;nbsp;So the least priv app does not
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; have the ability to execute content. &amp;nbsp;Since xguest has the ability to
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; execute perl, sh, python and other interpreters, the value of shutting
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; down execution in the homedir is questionable. &amp;nbsp;This means
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; ~/bin/myscript.sh will fail, but sh ~/bin/myscript.sh will work. &amp;nbsp;The
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; blocking of execution does work for all compiled code.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;OK, that explains what I was seeing.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; The policy is for the boolean allows the execution of user_home_t, but
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; not other labeled file in the homedir, which is a bug.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;And I think that explains why changing the booleans didn't fix my specific
&lt;br&gt;situation.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Thanks for the explanation.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20664619&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Which-permission-to-execute-a-script--tp20523189p20664619.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20663504</id>
	<title>Re: GCL</title>
	<published>2008-11-24T07:52:49Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-24T07:52:49Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Jerry James-3</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 8:43 AM, Daniel J Walsh &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20663504&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;dwalsh@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Yes, please open a bugzilla.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; We can make a duplicate policy for GCL to java, with execheap. &amp;nbsp;But we
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; need to track this via bugzilla.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Okay, here it is.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=472780&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=472780&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Thanks,
&lt;br&gt;-- 
&lt;br&gt;Jerry James
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://loganjerry.googlepages.com/&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://loganjerry.googlepages.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20663504&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/GCL-tp20585548p20663504.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20663299</id>
	<title>Re: GCL</title>
	<published>2008-11-24T07:43:10Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-24T07:43:10Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Jerry James wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 8:14 AM, Daniel J Walsh &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20663299&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;dwalsh@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Ok, is the GCL package available in Fedora? &amp;nbsp;This probably should be
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; opened as a bugzilla. &amp;nbsp;If gcl really needs execheap, we need to create a
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; new policy for it, since execmem_exec_t apps currently do not get this
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; and I really don't want to give them this. &amp;nbsp;I guess I would like to hear
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Ulrich Drepper chime in on this need.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; The GCL package has been in Fedora since 2005, but has not built
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; successfully for months. &amp;nbsp;I recently took over as maintainer and am
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; trying to get it into a buildable state again. &amp;nbsp;I've fixed the other
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; problems; this seems to be the final blocker.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; If I make the saved images have type execmem_exec_t, then the build
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; produces the &amp;quot;early&amp;quot; image successfully. &amp;nbsp;When that image runs and
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; tries to load up a bunch of Lisp files to produce the final image,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; SELinux kills it with an AVC denial that mentions execheap. &amp;nbsp;I
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; mentioned on fedora-devel-list that making the saved images have type
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; java_exec_t produces a successful build. &amp;nbsp;If you can tell me how to
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; test with exactly execmem + execheap privileges, then I can make sure
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; there is nothing else in the java_exec_t set that GCL needs.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Otherwise, we may have to go through multiple iterations of &amp;quot;no wait,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; GCL needs one more permission&amp;quot;.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Do I need to audit the source code to discover the reason for the
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; execheap need? &amp;nbsp;I can guess; it's probably (eval form) that needs it,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; but I don't know that for sure.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Say the word and I'll make a bugzilla entry for this. &amp;nbsp;Thanks for your help.
&lt;/div&gt;Yes, please open a bugzilla.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;We can make a duplicate policy for GCL to java, with execheap. &amp;nbsp;But we
&lt;br&gt;need to track this via bugzilla.
&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkkqy44ACgkQrlYvE4MpobNJrQCfSR9kDnPc9i8mUy94mOZtJ+th
&lt;br&gt;nTcAniypT1D+gpNMV3x8F8onG1wUKn66
&lt;br&gt;=UnCw
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20663299&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/GCL-tp20585548p20663299.html" />
</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:www.nabble.com,2006:post-20663256</id>
	<title>Re: Which permission to execute a script?</title>
	<published>2008-11-24T07:40:56Z</published>
	<updated>2008-11-24T07:40:56Z</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Daniel J Walsh</name>
	</author>
	<content type="html">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
&lt;br&gt;Hash: SHA1
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Bruno Wolff III wrote:
&lt;div class='shrinkable-quote'&gt;&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; On Mon, Nov 17, 2008 at 19:07:40 -0600,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; Bruno Wolff III &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20663256&amp;i=0&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;bruno@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; On Mon, Nov 17, 2008 at 17:07:42 -0600,
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; &amp;nbsp; Bruno Wolff III &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20663256&amp;i=1&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;bruno@...&lt;/a&gt;&amp;gt; wrote:
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; There doesn't seem to be a http_user_script_exec_t type. Probably it's a
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; typo, but I didn't see a way to get a full list and didn't manage to
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; guess the correct name.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Yep, typo. For the archive, 'seinfo -t' provides a list of types.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; The guest policy (at least my modified version) does not allow access to
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; files labelled httpd_user_script_exec_t.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; I'll keep putzing with this.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I have it working now. In the end I needed to give both execute and
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; execute_no_trans permission for tom_t running httpd_sys_script_exec_t.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; The allow_xguest_exec_content and allow_guest_exec_content booleans
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; didn't seem to make a difference.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; Going forward I might want to spend the time to dial this policy back
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; as I am executing the scripts with those types as an unconfined user
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; (or perhaps I should use the user_u role) and I'd like to prevent tom_t
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; from changing them (or replacing the files) with selinux.
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; 
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; I was having trouble finding what the manage_files_pattern and
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; manage_dirs_pattern macros expand to and exactly what functions some
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; of the permissions allow. Is there any good documentation of these things
&lt;br&gt;&amp;gt; online?
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;A couple of things, people have asked for the ability to stop the
&lt;br&gt;execution of programs in the homedir. &amp;nbsp;So the least priv app does not
&lt;br&gt;have the ability to execute content. &amp;nbsp;Since xguest has the ability to
&lt;br&gt;execute perl, sh, python and other interpreters, the value of shutting
&lt;br&gt;down execution in the homedir is questionable. &amp;nbsp;This means
&lt;br&gt;~/bin/myscript.sh will fail, but sh ~/bin/myscript.sh will work. &amp;nbsp;The
&lt;br&gt;blocking of execution does work for all compiled code.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The policy is for the boolean allows the execution of user_home_t, but
&lt;br&gt;not other labeled file in the homedir, which is a bug.
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
&lt;br&gt;Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - &lt;a href=&quot;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://enigmail.mozdev.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;iEYEARECAAYFAkkqywcACgkQrlYvE4MpobNYZQCfYVlEjsxEouyMpe2yJgxnZEOV
&lt;br&gt;7QcAn0Ys5OU0YLQU75I4fFaRFmzK11Ec
&lt;br&gt;=GyTO
&lt;br&gt;-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;--
&lt;br&gt;fedora-selinux-list mailing list
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nabble.com/user/SendEmail.jtp?type=post&amp;post=20663256&amp;i=2&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;fedora-selinux-list@...&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&quot; target=&quot;_top&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;</content>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.nabble.com/Which-permission-to-execute-a-script--tp20523189p20663256.html" />
</entry>

</feed>
