EJBCA and next Bull Trustway cryptocard with ECDSA

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EJBCA and next Bull Trustway cryptocard with ECDSA

by Sozet Florent :: Rate this Message:

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Hello,

In France, only one HSM is certified to make "qualified" certificates : the Bull TrustWay CryptoCard.

Bull told us that their next certified TrustWay card will content only SHA256 and ECDSA algorithms, no SHA1 and no RSA.

We need to use this version because we have to use SHA256.

We have questions about the compatibilty of this HSM card with EJBCA, in terms of algorithms.

This is an extract of the EJBCA documentation :

-------------------------------------

- Genarated keys and certificate

When generating a CA in EJBCA up to three keys and certificates are generated:

* A CA signing keypair and certificate

* An encryption keypair, used for encrypting keyrecovery information

* An OCSP signer keypair and certificate

When using ECDSA keys, the CA signing keypair and the OCSP signer keypair will be the ECDSA keytype you select when creating the CA. The CA signing and OCSP signing certificate will be signed using your selected signature algorithm.

The encryption keypair will always be RSA, using 1024 or 2048 bit key length. It uses the key length set in the admin-GUI or 2048 bit by default using the cli. A dummy encryption certificate will be created using SHA1WithRSA.

- Using ECDSA with an HSM

See the section about HSM property parameters to see which keys can be of different sorts. Note that the keyEncryptKey can not be ECDSA, but should be an RSA key. Your HSM must support both ECDSA and RSA keys.

-------------------------------------

As I said before, the next version of the Bull TrustWay card will not support both ECDSA and RSA algo.

Are these 3 keypairs always generated ? used ?

Can we configure EJBCA to not generate/use the RSA keypair, if we don't need key recovery ?

Why the keyEncryptKey can not be ECDSA ?

In previous Key Ceremonies with EJBCA and with Safenet HSM, we have generated only one RSA KeyPair (AC KeyPair) in the HSM.

- Was this same keypair used for OCSP and key recovery ?

- Was additional soft keypairs generated for OCSP and key recovery ?

thank you

best regards,

Florent

Ce message et les pièces jointes sont confidentiels et réservés à l'usage exclusif de ses destinataires. Il peut également être protégé par le secret professionnel. Si vous recevez ce message par erreur, merci d'en avertir immédiatement l'expéditeur et de le détruire. L'intégrité du message ne pouvant être assurée sur Internet, la responsabilité du groupe Atos Origin ne pourra être recherchée quant au contenu de ce message. Bien que les meilleurs efforts soient faits pour maintenir cette transmission exempte de tout virus, l'expéditeur ne donne aucune garantie à cet égard et sa responsabilité ne saurait être recherchée pour tout dommage résultant d'un virus transmis.

This e-mail and the documents attached are confidential and intended solely for the addressee; it may also be privileged. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and destroy it. As its integrity cannot be secured on the Internet, the Atos Origin group liability cannot be triggered for the message content. Although the sender endeavours to maintain a computer virus-free network, the sender does not warrant that this transmission is virus-free and will not be liable for any damages resulting from any virus transmitted.

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Re: EJBCA and next Bull Trustway cryptocard with ECDSA

by Lars Silvén :: Rate this Message:

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All different keys that could be stored in an HSM and used in EJBCA is described in the user guide:
http://ejbca.org/manual.html#Hardware%20Security%20Modules%20(HSM)

If you define the 'defaultKey' then you don't have to define any other keys.

The P11 API is used to access the Bull HSM. So it should be possible to use all Bull p11 algorithms.
Unfortunately all p11 supported algorithms can not be used due to that you are selecting the algorithm from a fixed list when configuring a CA in EJBCA.
As it is now it is also possible that you will select an algorithm not supported by the HSM, in this case an exception will be thrown.

This behaviour is not good. The list of algorithms that is presented when configuring the HSM should consist of the list of algorithms that the p11 module says that it supports.
This is an improvement that will be done sooner or later. You can get is sooner if you pay us for doing it.

I will now answer your questions see below.

Best Regards,

Lars

Sozet Florent wrote:

> Hello,
>
>
>
> In France, only one HSM is certified to make "qualified" certificates :
> the Bull TrustWay CryptoCard.
>
>
>
> Bull told us that their next certified TrustWay card will content only
> SHA256 and ECDSA algorithms, no SHA1 and no RSA.
>
>
>
> We need to use this version because we have to use SHA256.
>
>
>
> We have questions about the compatibilty of this HSM card with EJBCA, in
> terms of algorithms.
>
>
>
> This is an extract of the EJBCA documentation :
>
>
>
> -------------------------------------
>
>
>
> - Genarated keys and certificate
>
>
>
> When generating a CA in EJBCA up to three keys and certificates are
> generated:
>
>
>
> * A CA signing keypair and certificate
>
> * An encryption keypair, used for encrypting keyrecovery information
>
> * An OCSP signer keypair and certificate
>
>
>
> When using ECDSA keys, the CA signing keypair and the OCSP signer
> keypair will be the ECDSA keytype you select when creating the CA. The
> CA signing and OCSP signing certificate will be signed using your
> selected signature algorithm.
>
> The encryption keypair will always be RSA, using 1024 or 2048 bit key
> length. It uses the key length set in the admin-GUI or 2048 bit by
> default using the cli. A dummy encryption certificate will be created
> using SHA1WithRSA.
>
>
>
> - Using ECDSA with an HSM
>
>
>
> See the section about HSM property parameters to see which keys can be
> of different sorts. Note that the keyEncryptKey can not be ECDSA, but
> should be an RSA key. Your HSM must support both ECDSA and RSA keys.
>
>
>
> -------------------------------------
>
>
>
> As I said before, the next version of the Bull TrustWay card will not
> support both ECDSA and RSA algo.
>
>
>
> Are these 3 keypairs always generated ? used ?

If you are only specifying the the 'defaultKey' only one key will be used.
>
>
>
> Can we configure EJBCA to not generate/use the RSA keypair, if we don't
> need key recovery ?
Yes. Just don't specify 'keyEncryptKey in the properties.
>
>
>
> Why the keyEncryptKey can not be ECDSA ?
It has just not been put in the "fixed" list. See above.
>
>
>
> In previous Key Ceremonies with EJBCA and with Safenet HSM, we have
> generated only one RSA KeyPair (AC KeyPair) in the HSM.
>
>
>
> - Was this same keypair used for OCSP and key recovery ?
Yes. You must have only specified the 'defaultKey' key.
>
> or
>
> - Was additional soft keypairs generated for OCSP and key recovery ?
No

>
>
>
> thank you
>
> best regards,
>
> Florent
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Ce message et les pièces jointes sont confidentiels et réservés à
> l'usage exclusif de ses destinataires. Il peut également être protégé
> par le secret professionnel. Si vous recevez ce message par erreur,
> merci d'en avertir immédiatement l'expéditeur et de le détruire.
> L'intégrité du message ne pouvant être assurée sur Internet, la
> responsabilité du groupe Atos Origin ne pourra être recherchée quant au
> contenu de ce message. Bien que les meilleurs efforts soient faits pour
> maintenir cette transmission exempte de tout virus, l'expéditeur ne
> donne aucune garantie à cet égard et sa responsabilité ne saurait être
> recherchée pour tout dommage résultant d'un virus transmis.
>
> This e-mail and the documents attached are confidential and intended
> solely for the addressee; it may also be privileged. If you receive this
> e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and destroy it. As
> its integrity cannot be secured on the Internet, the Atos Origin group
> liability cannot be triggered for the message content. Although the
> sender endeavours to maintain a computer virus-free network, the sender
> does not warrant that this transmission is virus-free and will not be
> liable for any damages resulting from any virus transmitted.
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> This SF.net email is sponsored by: Microsoft
> Defy all challenges. Microsoft(R) Visual Studio 2008.
> http://clk.atdmt.com/MRT/go/vse0120000070mrt/direct/01/
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Ejbca-develop mailing list
> Ejbca-develop@...
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/ejbca-develop

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Defy all challenges. Microsoft(R) Visual Studio 2008.
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_______________________________________________
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