An Equivalence Principle

[Youness Ayaita]

By this contribution to the Everything list I want to argue that there
is a fundamental equivalence between the first person and the third
person viewpoint: Under few assumptions I show that it doesn't matter
for our reasoning whether we understand the Everything ensemble as the
ensemble of all worlds (a third person viewpoint) or as the ensemble
of all observer moments (a first person viewpoint). I think that this
result is even more substantial than the assumptions from which it can
be deduced. Thus, I further suggest to reverse my argument considering
the last statement as a principle, the equivalence principle.

Let me first present and explain the two viewpoints:

1. The ensemble of worlds

This approach starts from the ontological basis of all worlds (or
descriptions thereof). I am not precise to what exactly I refer by
saying "worlds" and "descriptions" for I don't want to lose wider
applicability of my arguments by restricting myself to specific
theories of the Everything ensemble. But admittedly, I mainly think of
theories similar to Russell's ideas. However, the crucial property of
theories starting from the ensemble of worlds consists in their third
person viewpoint. The ontological basis does not explicitly refer to
observers nor to observer moments. Observers are regarded as being
self-aware substructures of the worlds they inhabit.

Coming from the sciences, this approach is very natural. In the
sciences, we are used to the idea of a physical reality independent of
us humans. We are studying phenomena happening in our universe. Thus,
when we invent a theory of the Everything ensemble, we are naturally
driven to the idea that not only our universe, but a multiverse
consisting of all possible worlds exists. We already know how
observers come into the scene: As an emergent property, a huge number
of the fundamental building blocks can constitute an observer. In
order to understand this, one has to introduce a semantic language
which describes the emergent phenomenon. The description of the world
itself is expressed in the syntactic language (I adopt Russell's
nomenclature). The link between between these two languages is some
kind of neurological theory explaining how the states of the
fundamental building blocks (more precise: the description of the
world) lead to mental states (or the emergence of an observer).
Though, finding such a neurological theory is a very difficult task.
In this world, we are facing the so-called hard problem of
consciousness. And even if neurologists, psychologists and
philosophers will finally succeed to find an adequate theory in this
world, it is not clear whether we can apply the theory to other
worlds.

So, to conclude, this approach has the great advantage of being very
close to the structure of the physical worlds. The explanation of
observers and observer moments seems to be possible, but surely is
very complicated and difficult.

2. The ensemble of observer moments

When I first thought of the Everything ensemble, I did not come from
the sciences, but from philosophy. I judged that the concept of
absolute "existence" was a dubious extension of the concepts of
subjective accessibility and perceptibility. So, it was natural for me
to start from the ensemble of observer moments, a first person
viewpoint. The class of all observer moments constitutes the
ontological basis of this second approach. Later, I realized that the
theory of the Everything ensemble could be used to draw conclusions
about the physical world. But this seemed to be unfeasible starting
from observer moments: the relatively simple laws of nature that we
find in our universe are obscured by the complex properties of our
senses. Starting from observer moments seemed to be a complication.
Consequently, I switched viewpoints and studied the ensemble of
worlds. I always hoped that both approaches would finally turn out to
be equivalent.

Even in principle, it is very difficult to think of "worlds" when
starting from observer moments only. This task is similar to
understanding observer moments when starting from the descriptions of
worlds. Starting from worlds, we must identify the observer moments as
substructres. Starting from observer moments, we must somehow extract
information that allows us to meaningfully talk about a world. From
the sciences, we know how difficult this is because there we try to
find a description of our world given our observer moments. We see how
complementary the two approaches are: The first approach needed some
kind of neurological theory to explain the appearance of observer
moments within a world, the second approach needs some kind of
physical theory to explain the appearance of a world when first
studying observer moments. The two approaches are another
manifestation of the deep connection between laws of physics and
properties of an observer.

The assumptions

My first assumption is related to our reasoning. The equivalence of
the two approaches does not mean that they are identical. I will say
that they have identical implications for our reasoning. To clarify
this, I must first explain how we shall reason. Here, I take the ASSA
(maybe we can check during the discussion whether or not my argument
generalizes to other versions of the self-sampling assumption):

'Each observer moment should reason as if it were randomly selected
from the class of all observer moments.'

The second assumption is more subtle. Suppose we take the first
approach, with all worlds as ontological basis. We explain observer
moments with the help of some neurological theories. At first, it is
not clear whether we can find every possible observer moment under
these emergent observer moments. The assumption is that we can. Every
possible observer moment is realized in at least one world.

Perhaps, some of you remember that I wrote about this topic September
last year. At that time, I came to the conclusions that the
equivalence did not exist. But yesterday, I read Bostrom's paper that
is currently analyzed on this list ("Quantity of experience: brain-
duplication and degrees of consciousness") and I understood that
September last year I took for granted what Bostrom calls
"Duplication". His arguments in favor of Duplication didn't convince
me, quite the opposite happened: I have adopted the other position,
"Unification".

The question Bostrom raises is the following: "Suppose two brains are
in the same conscious state. Are there two minds [Duplication], two
streams of conscious experience? Or only one [Unification]?"

This may seem to be a matter of definition. But let us return to the
ASSA: Which measure should be assigned to each observer moment? Given
Unification it is natural to assign a uniform measure: no observer
moment is more likely to be selected than any other. Given Duplication
it is natural to assign a measure to each observer moment proportional
to the number of its occurences in the Everything ensemble.

I assume a uniform measure. Surely, we can soften this assumption.
Nonetheless, it is decisive that the measure does not fundamentally
depend on the worlds but can also be deduced when taking the class of
observer moments as ontological basis. This is why I think that the
RSSA does not do any worse than the ASSA.

The equivalence principle

'Our reasoning does not depend on whether the ensemble of worlds or
the ensemble of observer moments is considered fundamental.'

I assumed that our reasoning should follow from the ASSA (or any other
version of the SSA compatible with my argument). Due to Unification,
we cannot detect any difference between the two different approaches:
The measure for each observer moment is the same.

The equivalence principle is a fundamental expression of what Russell
so eloquently explained in his book: "Not only is our psyche emergent
from the eletrical and chemical goings on in our brain, but the laws
governing that chemico-electrical behaviour in turn depend on our
psyche."

I speculate that both approaches to the Everything ensemble, the
ensemble of worlds and the ensemble of observer moments, are two
different windows to the same theory.

Youness Ayaita
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[Colin Hales-2]

Hi,
I think I have an argument  in support of the 'equivalence' of 3rd and
1st person descriptions of the natural world in the sense that you
offer. It works by loking at the world predicted by the 1P=3P identity.
I agree with your sentiments:

....The equivalence of the two approaches does not mean that they are identical. I will say
that they have identical implications for our reasoning.

... but perhaps not via the route you use. You don't need QM-speak at
all. All you have to do is focus on the empirical evidence of science
itself as a cognitive act and in the application of science to the
scientific description of brain material which then results in the
scientific description of scientists thus enabled through the provision
of the 1stP, which is 100% the source of scientific observation (an
empirically verifiable fact). I always have trouble with these
sentences! Read it a couple of times....
===================
Step 1.
Let us start with a characterisation of what might be claimed as the
received (programmed by training) view of the mainstream physicist as
expressed by [1] Gari Lisi in 2007 "An exceptionally simple theory of
everything". The very first paragraph of which is:

"Introduction
We exist in a universe described by mathematics. But which math?
Although it is interesting
to consider that the universe may be the physical instantiation of all
mathematics,[1]
there is a classic principle for restricting the possibilities: The
mathematics of the universe
should be beautiful. A successful description of nature should be a
concise, elegant, unified
mathematical structure consistent with experience."

YES there is only describing going on - NOT explanation....OK... but  I
disagree with "We exist in a universe described by mathematics" in the
sense that NO, " We exist in a universe described by scientists" and
does 'UNIFIED' imply 'COMPLETE'?....And where is this unseen computer
running the TOE as a program?  sorry.......I digress....it's a minefield
of preconceptions and assumptions. .....

but.....more important is at the 'meta-level' and involves how Lisi's
claim represents the accepted view of what physics purports to be
doing.... generating a 'theory of everything' which involves "A
successful description of nature should be a concise, elegant, unifed
mathematical structure consistent with experience." AFAICT in the
criticisms of Lisi that followed his submission nobody disagreed with
this particular statement in that concern was confined to the details of
his model.  This fact is important in what follows.....Let us accept it
as a claim merely as an accurate representation of the belief systems of
physicists (regardless of its truth) about what they do or are trying,
ultimately, to do.

=====================
Step 2.
Next let us examine the word "EVERYTHING". There are two senses of the
use of this word which I express as two hypotheses in respect of the
state of affairs implicit in such a 'theory of everything'. The first is
literal/absolute:

2a) that such a theory shall explain absolutely everything. That is it
shall be literally predictive of ALL aspects of the natural world in all
its expressions.

and then there is this 'relative' definition:

2b) that such a theory merely represents what physicists describe as
being 'everything' in the sense that what it does not explain is to
remain methodologically (as a matter of procedure) unexplained or is
(tacitly) methodologically *defined* as unexplainable in principle....

These are two very different states of affairs and the applicability of
their status in in relation to any instance of a "theory of
_everything_" seems to be overlooked somewhat.

=======================
Step 3.
Here is where we get empirical evidence. This is observed inside LISI's
theory and evident in his words:
".........*consistent with* experience."
as compared with the possible phrase:
".........*predictive of* experience."

For there is something that is NOT predicted by the 'theory of
everything': _experience itself_.

.........Lisi's theory does not predict the existence of or otherwise
explain brain material behaviour relating to the scientist's internal
life(= Lisi, himself). NOTE: I do not refer here any _particular_
(contents of) experience used as scientific evidence. I mean experience
itself..._the very fact of it_.... the empirically verified  
specifically neurologically empirically demonstrable, localisable
delivery of a first person perspective that results from matter
configured as we see (experience) when we observe it with that same
first person observation system: cranial central nervous system material.

NOTE: There is a serious logical flaw in the scientific evidence system
in that to demand experience (Lisi's."...consistent with...") as
scientific evidence and then to deny that the scientific evidence system
(experience itself) has been evidenced (it is a methodological denial -
otherwise how could it be a 'theory of _everything_'?) is like accepting
the time from a demanded clock and then, time in hand, methodologically
denying that a clock has been evidenced. ...moving on....

=========================
Step 4.
Here's the logical outcome:
FACT: Lisi claims to have a "theory of everything"
FACT: Lisi's theory fails to predict experience itself.

Therefore Lisi's theory is
4a) False because Hypothesis 2a) is false.
4b) True because Hypothesis 2b) is true.

so...either
4a) puts physicists in  the usual scientific position of a 'scientific
refutation', except that it is in respect of principles underlying their
own behaviour.
 or
4b) puts physics is in a bizarre epistemological trap where they
methodologically deny their own evidence source evidenced it its role as
a valid originator of descriptions of it, predictive of its contents,
whilst demanding it be used. In this case the physicist are perfectly
right but because they methodologically constrain themselves to be so.

Physicists are in an awkward place, regardless...especially in the face
of an empirically verified reality of very specialised deliverer of a
first person perspective which is unexplained (by any existing physical
laws, which merely describe) and at the same time upon which those same
physicists are totally dependent on for all scientific
observations...indeed Lisi's words actually demand that the first person
perspective shall be involved!

And as if this weren't enough... there's an empirical neuroscience
argument which dispenses with the 1stP=3rdP claim: It's the same
neurological evidence used to flush the 'homunculus hypothesis':
=========================
Auxillary Step)
Claiming that the 1stP=3rdP is identical with the claim that the world
is literally constructed of 'appearances'. Thus as a scientitist intent
on empirically verifying the hypothesis based this "literally
constructed of appearances"  premise:

"It is a truth of the natural world that the universe is literally made
of what it appears to be made of, or the 'rules' that those appearances
portray"

The prediction of this hypothesis is that when you open up a cranium you
will _literally objectively (3P) see the appearances themselves_. That
is, if a person is experiencing something green and moving then a
scientific observation of something green and moving shall be visible
somewhere inside the cranium... for 1stP = 3rdP... so it must apply to
the 'appearances themselves'... to be consistent with the circumstances
of all other scientific observation where that can be seen to be the case.

BUT:   The empirical outcome is in the negative....We do not literally
see the experiences. What we actually see is brain material in the act
of delivery of them.

This disparity between expected and actual evidence renders the
hypothesis falsified.

You then have to go back to your premises. This means that 1stP DOES NOT
= 3rdP. From this it follows that the 'descriptions' that are a 'theory
of everything' (3P) and the complete set of descriptions _are not the
identical set of descriptions_. I am not saying anything about the
natural of the additional set of descdriptions. I say merely that they
necessarily exist and that it is likely the only reason they do not is
that 2b) is tacitly accepted 'rule of the game'.

===========================
PRACTICAL NOTE:
Having any belief in the existence or otherwise of an external reality
changes nothing. It is irrelevant.

You may not accept various aspects of this argument, but I think you may
agree that it reveals inconsistent belief systems of physicists and
raises meta-scientific questions insufficiently addressed by those whose
scientific ambit is the most general - the physicist and in particular
the cosmologist.

regards,
Colin Hales

[1] Lisi, G. (2007) An exceptionally simple theory of everything.
http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.0770
======================================================


Youness Ayaita wrote:

> By this contribution to the Everything list I want to argue that there
> is a fundamental equivalence between the first person and the third
> person viewpoint: Under few assumptions I show that it doesn't matter
> for our reasoning whether we understand the Everything ensemble as the
> ensemble of all worlds (a third person viewpoint) or as the ensemble
> of all observer moments (a first person viewpoint). I think that this
> result is even more substantial than the assumptions from which it can
> be deduced. Thus, I further suggest to reverse my argument considering
> the last statement as a principle, the equivalence principle.
>
> Let me first present and explain the two viewpoints:
>
> 1. The ensemble of worlds
>
> This approach starts from the ontological basis of all worlds (or
> descriptions thereof). I am not precise to what exactly I refer by
> saying "worlds" and "descriptions" for I don't want to lose wider
> applicability of my arguments by restricting myself to specific
> theories of the Everything ensemble. But admittedly, I mainly think of
> theories similar to Russell's ideas. However, the crucial property of
> theories starting from the ensemble of worlds consists in their third
> person viewpoint. The ontological basis does not explicitly refer to
> observers nor to observer moments. Observers are regarded as being
> self-aware substructures of the worlds they inhabit.
>
> Coming from the sciences, this approach is very natural. In the
> sciences, we are used to the idea of a physical reality independent of
> us humans. We are studying phenomena happening in our universe. Thus,
> when we invent a theory of the Everything ensemble, we are naturally
> driven to the idea that not only our universe, but a multiverse
> consisting of all possible worlds exists. We already know how
> observers come into the scene: As an emergent property, a huge number
> of the fundamental building blocks can constitute an observer. In
> order to understand this, one has to introduce a semantic language
> which describes the emergent phenomenon. The description of the world
> itself is expressed in the syntactic language (I adopt Russell's
> nomenclature). The link between between these two languages is some
> kind of neurological theory explaining how the states of the
> fundamental building blocks (more precise: the description of the
> world) lead to mental states (or the emergence of an observer).
> Though, finding such a neurological theory is a very difficult task.
> In this world, we are facing the so-called hard problem of
> consciousness. And even if neurologists, psychologists and
> philosophers will finally succeed to find an adequate theory in this
> world, it is not clear whether we can apply the theory to other
> worlds.
>
> So, to conclude, this approach has the great advantage of being very
> close to the structure of the physical worlds. The explanation of
> observers and observer moments seems to be possible, but surely is
> very complicated and difficult.
>
> 2. The ensemble of observer moments
>
> When I first thought of the Everything ensemble, I did not come from
> the sciences, but from philosophy. I judged that the concept of
> absolute "existence" was a dubious extension of the concepts of
> subjective accessibility and perceptibility. So, it was natural for me
> to start from the ensemble of observer moments, a first person
> viewpoint. The class of all observer moments constitutes the
> ontological basis of this second approach. Later, I realized that the
> theory of the Everything ensemble could be used to draw conclusions
> about the physical world. But this seemed to be unfeasible starting
> from observer moments: the relatively simple laws of nature that we
> find in our universe are obscured by the complex properties of our
> senses. Starting from observer moments seemed to be a complication.
> Consequently, I switched viewpoints and studied the ensemble of
> worlds. I always hoped that both approaches would finally turn out to
> be equivalent.
>
> Even in principle, it is very difficult to think of "worlds" when
> starting from observer moments only. This task is similar to
> understanding observer moments when starting from the descriptions of
> worlds. Starting from worlds, we must identify the observer moments as
> substructres. Starting from observer moments, we must somehow extract
> information that allows us to meaningfully talk about a world. From
> the sciences, we know how difficult this is because there we try to
> find a description of our world given our observer moments. We see how
> complementary the two approaches are: The first approach needed some
> kind of neurological theory to explain the appearance of observer
> moments within a world, the second approach needs some kind of
> physical theory to explain the appearance of a world when first
> studying observer moments. The two approaches are another
> manifestation of the deep connection between laws of physics and
> properties of an observer.
>
> The assumptions
>
> My first assumption is related to our reasoning. The equivalence of
> the two approaches does not mean that they are identical. I will say
> that they have identical implications for our reasoning. To clarify
> this, I must first explain how we shall reason. Here, I take the ASSA
> (maybe we can check during the discussion whether or not my argument
> generalizes to other versions of the self-sampling assumption):
>
> 'Each observer moment should reason as if it were randomly selected
> from the class of all observer moments.'
>
> The second assumption is more subtle. Suppose we take the first
> approach, with all worlds as ontological basis. We explain observer
> moments with the help of some neurological theories. At first, it is
> not clear whether we can find every possible observer moment under
> these emergent observer moments. The assumption is that we can. Every
> possible observer moment is realized in at least one world.
>
> Perhaps, some of you remember that I wrote about this topic September
> last year. At that time, I came to the conclusions that the
> equivalence did not exist. But yesterday, I read Bostrom's paper that
> is currently analyzed on this list ("Quantity of experience: brain-
> duplication and degrees of consciousness") and I understood that
> September last year I took for granted what Bostrom calls
> "Duplication". His arguments in favor of Duplication didn't convince
> me, quite the opposite happened: I have adopted the other position,
> "Unification".
>
> The question Bostrom raises is the following: "Suppose two brains are
> in the same conscious state. Are there two minds [Duplication], two
> streams of conscious experience? Or only one [Unification]?"
>
> This may seem to be a matter of definition. But let us return to the
> ASSA: Which measure should be assigned to each observer moment? Given
> Unification it is natural to assign a uniform measure: no observer
> moment is more likely to be selected than any other. Given Duplication
> it is natural to assign a measure to each observer moment proportional
> to the number of its occurences in the Everything ensemble.
>
> I assume a uniform measure. Surely, we can soften this assumption.
> Nonetheless, it is decisive that the measure does not fundamentally
> depend on the worlds but can also be deduced when taking the class of
> observer moments as ontological basis. This is why I think that the
> RSSA does not do any worse than the ASSA.
>
> The equivalence principle
>
> 'Our reasoning does not depend on whether the ensemble of worlds or
> the ensemble of observer moments is considered fundamental.'
>
> I assumed that our reasoning should follow from the ASSA (or any other
> version of the SSA compatible with my argument). Due to Unification,
> we cannot detect any difference between the two different approaches:
> The measure for each observer moment is the same.
>
> The equivalence principle is a fundamental expression of what Russell
> so eloquently explained in his book: "Not only is our psyche emergent
> from the eletrical and chemical goings on in our brain, but the laws
> governing that chemico-electrical behaviour in turn depend on our
> psyche."
>
> I speculate that both approaches to the Everything ensemble, the
> ensemble of worlds and the ensemble of observer moments, are two
> different windows to the same theory.
>
> Youness Ayaita
> >
>  

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[bengprice]

However, the crucial property of theories starting from the ensemble of worlds consists
in their third person viewpoint. The ontological basis does not explicitly refer to observers
nor to observer moments. Observers are regarded as being self-aware substructures
of the worlds they inhabit.

                    
Youness Ayaita

All you have to do is focus on the empirical evidence of science 

itself as a cognitive act and in the application of science to the 

scientific description of brain material which then results in the 

scientific description of scientists thus enabled through the provision 

of the 1stP, which is 100% the source of scientific observation (an 

empirically verifiable fact). 

Colin Hales

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greetings and thanks for this interesting discussion,

An untutored aphorism, perhaps, but "the map is not the territory" seems a satisfying, even elegant shorthand with some applicability here. Deciding not to have a theory inclusive of subjectivity seems equivalent to deciding on a map that is, in fact, not a theory of "everything" but perhaps a theory of everything except the observer holding the theory (experiential map). Can the ensemble of experiencing observers (1st person subjectivities) be equivalent to the ensemble of theories (maps) that in each unassembled instantiation fails to note the singularly observable fact in separate observers of subjective experience that is equivalent to each theory (experiential map)?

Admitting for the moment the premise that the theory (experiential map) is a faithful representation or unifying mathematical expression taking in all empirical (external/3rd person) observables, will assembling them in a hypothetical or conceptual library or warehouse be equivalent to similarly gathering the experience (of the users/creators) that creates those theories (experiential maps)?

Like placing two mirrors face to face, equivalence of image seems to multiply infinitely. And yet, with each reification of the image there is loss of fidelity, increasingly insufficient identity to even suggest an equivalence. And yet, it is the observer, off at some angle observing the mirrors, who is excluded from the faithful repetition of light images into a theoretical infinite regress.

I wonder if an inquiry into the equivalence of the observers (all 1st persons) might yield something necessary for the unified theory of observer and observed.

Ben Price

-----Original Message-----
From: Colin Hales <c.hales@...>
To: everything-list@...
Sent: Tue, 8 Apr 2008 12:01 am
Subject: Re: An Equivalence Principle

Hi,

I think I have an argument  in support of the 'equivalence' of 3rd and 

1st person descriptions of the natural world in the sense that you 

offer. It works by loking at the world predicted by the 1P=3P identity. 

I agree with your sentiments:



....The equivalence of the two approaches does not mean that they are identical. 

I will say

that they have identical implications for our reasoning.



... but perhaps not via the route you use. You don't need QM-speak at 

all. All you have to do is focus on the empirical evidence of science 

itself as a cognitive act and in the application of science to the 

scientific description of brain material which then results in the 

scientific description of scientists thus enabled through the provision 

of the 1stP, which is 100% the source of scientific observation (an 

empirically verifiable fact). I always have trouble with these 

sentences! Read it a couple of times....

===================

Step 1.

Let us start with a characterisation of what might be claimed as the 

received (programmed by training) view of the mainstream physicist as 

expressed by [1] Gari Lisi in 2007 "An exceptionally simple theory of 

everything". The very first paragraph of which is:



"Introduction

We exist in a universe described by mathematics. But which math? 

Although it is interesting

to consider that the universe may be the physical instantiation of all 

mathematics,[1]

there is a classic principle for restricting the possibilities: The 

mathematics of the universe

should be beautiful. A successful description of nature should be a 

concise, elegant, unified

mathematical structure consistent with experience."



YES there is only describing going on - NOT explanation....OK... but  I 

disagree with "We exist in a universe described by mathematics" in the 

sense that NO, " We exist in a universe described by scientists" and 

does 'UNIFIED' imply 'COMPLETE'?....And where is this unseen computer 

running the TOE as a program?  sorry.......I digress....it's a minefield 

of preconceptions and assumptions. .....



but.....more important is at the 'meta-level' and involves how Lisi's 

claim represents the accepted view of what physics purports to be 

doing.... generating a 'theory of everything' which involves "A 

successful description of nature should be a concise, elegant, unifed 

mathematical structure consistent with experience." AFAICT in the 

criticisms of Lisi that followed his submission nobody disagreed with 

this particular statement in that concern was confined to the details of 

his model.  This fact is important in what follows.....Let us accept it 

as a claim merely as an accurate representation of the belief systems of 

physicists (regardless of its truth) about what they do or are trying, 

ultimately, to do.



=====================

Step 2.

Next let us examine the word "EVERYTHING". There are two senses of the 

use of this word which I express as two hypotheses in respect of the 

state of affairs implicit in such a 'theory of everything'. The first is 

literal/absolute:



2a) that such a theory shall explain absolutely everything. That is it 

shall be literally predictive of ALL aspects of the natural world in all 

its expressions.



and then there is this 'relative' definition:



2b) that such a theory merely represents what physicists describe as 

being 'everything' in the sense that what it does not explain is to 

remain methodologically (as a matter of procedure) unexplained or is 

(tacitly) methodologically *defined* as unexplainable in principle....



These are two very different states of affairs and the applicability of 

their status in in relation to any instance of a "theory of 

_everything_" seems to be overlooked somewhat.



=======================

Step 3.

Here is where we get empirical evidence. This is observed inside LISI's 

theory and evident in his words:

".........*consistent with* experience."

as compared with the possible phrase:

".........*predictive of* experience."



For there is something that is NOT predicted by the 'theory of 

everything': _experience itself_.



.........Lisi's theory does not predict the existence of or otherwise 

explain brain material behaviour relating to the scientist's internal 

life(= Lisi, himself). NOTE: I do not refer here any _particular_ 

(contents of) experience used as scientific evidence. I mean experience 

itself..._the very fact of it_.... the empirically verified  

specifically neurologically empirically demonstrable, localisable 

delivery of a first person perspective that results from matter 

configured as we see (experience) when we observe it with that same 

first person observation system: cranial central nervous system material.



NOTE: There is a serious logical flaw in the scientific evidence system 

in that to demand experience (Lisi's."...consistent with...") as 

scientific evidence and then to deny that the scientific evidence system 

(experience itself) has been evidenced (it is a methodological denial - 

otherwise how could it be a 'theory of _everything_'?) is like accepting 

the time from a demanded clock and then, time in hand, methodologically 

denying that a clock has been evidenced. ...moving on....



=========================

Step 4.

Here's the logical outcome:

FACT: Lisi claims to have a "theory of everything"

FACT: Lisi's theory fails to predict experience itself.



Therefore Lisi's theory is

4a) False because Hypothesis 2a) is false.

4b) True because Hypothesis 2b) is true.



so...either

4a) puts physicists in  the usual scientific position of a 'scientific 

refutation', except that it is in respect of principles underlying their 

own behaviour.

 or

4b) puts physics is in a bizarre epistemological trap where they 

methodologically deny their own evidence source evidenced it its role as 

a valid originator of descriptions of it, predictive of its contents, 

whilst demanding it be used. In this case the physicist are perfectly 

right but because they methodologically constrain themselves to be so.



Physicists are in an awkward place, regardless...especially in the face 

of an empirically verified reality of very specialised deliverer of a 

first person perspective which is unexplained (by any existing physical 

laws, which merely describe) and at the same time upon which those same 

physicists are totally dependent on for all scientific 

observations...indeed Lisi's words actually demand that the first person 

perspective shall be involved!



And as if this weren't enough... there's an empirical neuroscience 

argument which dispenses with the 1stP=3rdP claim: It's the same 

neurological evidence used to flush the 'homunculus hypothesis':

=========================

Auxillary Step)

Claiming that the 1stP=3rdP is identical with the claim that the world 

is literally constructed of 'appearances'. Thus as a scientitist intent 

on empirically verifying the hypothesis based this "literally 

constructed of appearances"  premise:



"It is a truth of the natural world that the universe is literally made 

of what it appears to be made of, or the 'rules' that those appearances 

portray"



The prediction of this hypothesis is that when you open up a cranium you 

will _literally objectively (3P) see the appearances themselves_. That 

is, if a person is experiencing something green and moving then a 

scientific observation of something green and moving shall be visible 

somewhere inside the cranium... for 1stP = 3rdP... so it must apply to 

the 'appearances themselves'... to be consistent with the circumstances 

of all other scientific observation where that can be seen to be the case.



BUT:   The empirical outcome is in the negative....We do not literally 

see the experiences. What we actually see is brain material in the act 

of delivery of them.



This disparity between expected and actual evidence renders the 

hypothesis falsified.



You then have to go back to your premises. This means that 1stP DOES NOT 

= 3rdP. From this it follows that the 'descriptions' that are a 'theory 

of everything' (3P) and the complete set of descriptions _are not the 

identical set of descriptions_. I am not saying anything about the 

natural of the additional set of descdriptions. I say merely that they 

necessarily exist and that it is likely the only reason they do not is 

that 2b) is tacitly accepted 'rule of the game'.



===========================

PRACTICAL NOTE:

Having any belief in the existence or otherwise of an external reality 

changes nothing. It is irrelevant.



You may not accept various aspects of this argument, but I think you may 

agree that it reveals inconsistent belief systems of physicists and 

raises meta-scientific questions insufficiently addressed by those whose 

scientific ambit is the most general - the physicist and in particular 

the cosmologist.



regards,

Colin Hales



[1] Lisi, G. (2007) An exceptionally simple theory of everything. 

http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.0770

======================================================





Youness Ayaita wrote:

> By this contribution to the Everything list I want to argue that there

> is a fundamental equivalence between the first person and the third

> person viewpoint: Under few assumptions I show that it doesn't matter

> for our reasoning whether we understand the Everything ensemble as the

> ensemble of all worlds (a third person viewpoint) or as the ensemble

> of all observer moments (a first person viewpoint). I think that this

> result is even more substantial than the assumptions from which it can

> be deduced. Thus, I further suggest to reverse my argument considering

> the last statement as a principle, the equivalence principle.

>

> Let me first present and explain the two viewpoints:

>

> 1. The ensemble of worlds

>

> This approach starts from the ontological basis of all worlds (or

> descriptions thereof). I am not precise to what exactly I refer by

> saying "worlds" and "descriptions" for I don't want to lose wider

> applicability of my arguments by restricting myself to specific

> theories of the Everything ensemble. But admittedly, I mainly think of

> theories similar to Russell's ideas. However, the crucial property of

> theories starting from the ensemble of worlds consists in their third

> person viewpoint. The ontological basis does not explicitly refer to

> observers nor to observer moments. Observers are regarded as being

> self-aware substructures of the worlds they inhabit.

>

> Coming from the sciences, this approach is very natural. In the

> sciences, we are used to the idea of a physical reality independent of

> us humans. We are studying phenomena happening in our universe. Thus,

> when we invent a theory of the Everything ensemble, we are naturally

> driven to the idea that not only our universe, but a multiverse

> consisting of all possible worlds exists. We already know how

> observers come into the scene: As an emergent property, a huge number

> of the fundamental building blocks can constitute an observer. In

> order to understand this, one has to introduce a semantic language

> which describes the emergent phenomenon. The description of the world

> itself is expressed in the syntactic language (I adopt Russell's

> nomenclature). The link between between these two languages is some

> kind of neurological theory explaining how the states of the

> fundamental building blocks (more precise: the description of the

> world) lead to mental states (or the emergence of an observer).

> Though, finding such a neurological theory is a very difficult task.

> In this world, we are facing the so-called hard problem of

> consciousness. And even if neurologists, psychologists and

> philosophers will finally succeed to find an adequate theory in this

> world, it is not clear whether we can apply the theory to other

> worlds.

>

> So, to conclude, this approach has the great advantage of being very

> close to the structure of the physical worlds. The explanation of

> observers and observer moments seems to be possible, but surely is

> very complicated and difficult.

>

> 2. The ensemble of observer moments

>

> When I first thought of the Everything ensemble, I did not come from

> the sciences, but from philosophy. I judged that the concept of

> absolute "existence" was a dubious extension of the concepts of

> subjective accessibility and perceptibility. So, it was natural for me

> to start from the ensemble of observer moments, a first person

> viewpoint. The class of all observer moments constitutes the

> ontological basis of this second approach. Later, I realized that the

> theory of the Everything ensemble could be used to draw conclusions

> about the physical world. But this seemed to be unfeasible starting

> from observer moments: the relatively simple laws of nature that we

> find in our universe are obscured by the complex properties of our

> senses. Starting from observer moments seemed to be a complication.

> Consequently, I switched viewpoints and studied the ensemble of

> worlds. I always hoped that both approaches would finally turn out to

> be equivalent.

>

> Even in principle, it is very difficult to think of "worlds" when

> starting from observer moments only. This task is similar to

> understanding observer moments when starting from the descriptions of

> worlds. Starting from worlds, we must identify the observer moments as

> substructres. Starting from observer moments, we must somehow extract

> information that allows us to meaningfully talk about a world. From

> the sciences, we know how difficult this is because there we try to

> find a description of our world given our observer moments. We see how

> complementary the two approaches are: The first approach needed some

> kind of neurological theory to explain the appearance of observer

> moments within a world, the second approach needs some kind of

> physical theory to explain the appearance of a world when first

> studying observer moments. The two approaches are another

> manifestation of the deep connection between laws of physics and

> properties of an observer.

>

> The assumptions

>

> My first assumption is related to our reasoning. The equivalence of

> the two approaches does not mean that they are identical. I will say

> that they have identical implications for our reasoning. To clarify

> this, I must first explain how we shall reason. Here, I take the ASSA

> (maybe we can check during the discussion whether or not my argument

> generalizes to other versions of the self-sampling assumption):

>

> 'Each observer moment should reason as if it were randomly selected

> from the class of all observer moments.'

>

> The second assumption is more subtle. Suppose we take the first

> approach, with all worlds as ontological basis. We explain observer

> moments with the help of some neurological theories. At first, it is

> not clear whether we can find every possible observer moment under

> these emergent observer moments. The assumption is that we can. Every

> possible observer moment is realized in at least one world.

>

> Perhaps, some of you remember that I wrote about this topic September

> last year. At that time, I came to the conclusions that the

> equivalence did not exist. But yesterday, I read Bostrom's paper that

> is currently analyzed on this list ("Quantity of experience: brain-

> duplication and degrees of consciousness") and I understood that

> September last year I took for granted what Bostrom calls

> "Duplication". His arguments in favor of Duplication didn't convince

> me, quite the opposite happened: I have adopted the other position,

> "Unification".

>

> The question Bostrom raises is the following: "Suppose two brains are

> in the same conscious state. Are there two minds [Duplication], two

> streams of conscious experience? Or only one [Unification]?"

>

> This may seem to be a matter of definition. But let us return to the

> ASSA: Which measure should be assigned to each observer moment? Given

> Unification it is natural to assign a uniform measure: no observer

> moment is more likely to be selected than any other. Given Duplication

> it is natural to assign a measure to each observer moment proportional

> to the number of its occurences in the Everything ensemble.

>

> I assume a uniform measure. Surely, we can soften this assumption.

> Nonetheless, it is decisive that the measure does not fundamentally

> depend on the worlds but can also be deduced when taking the class of

> observer moments as ontological basis. This is why I think that the

> RSSA does not do any worse than the ASSA.

>

> The equivalence principle

>

> 'Our reasoning does not depend on whether the ensemble of worlds or

> the ensemble of observer moments is considered fundamental.'

>

> I assumed that our reasoning should follow from the ASSA (or any other

> version of the SSA compatible with my argument). Due to Unification,

> we cannot detect any difference between the two different approaches:

> The measure for each observer moment is the same.

>

> The equivalence principle is a fundamental expression of what Russell

> so eloquently explained in his book: "Not only is our psyche emergent

> from the eletrical and chemical goings on in our brain, but the laws

> governing that chemico-electrical behaviour in turn depend on our

> psyche."

>

> I speculate that both approaches to the Everything ensemble, the

> ensemble of worlds and the ensemble of observer moments, are two

> different windows to the same theory.

>

> Youness Ayaita

> >

>   

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[Youness Ayaita]

Bruno wanted me to a bit clearer what I mean by the "equivalence
principle" I introduced. As I tried to explain, there are two
apparently different approaches that lead to a theory of the
Everything ensemble. Roughly speaking (the details vary), we can start
from a theory of all "worlds" or from a theory of all "experiences" or
"observer moments". Both ways have diffculties in explaining the
concepts of the complementary approach. My point is that---under few
conditions---the choice is free. For a problem of interest, we are
allowed to take the simplest approach, and we will not contradict
ourselves when employing the other one. Hence the term "equivalence".

I call it an equivalence "principle" because I think that it is of
fundamental significance; personally, I prefer to take the second
approach, i.e. to start from the ensemble of all possible observer
moments. But sometimes, it will be very convenient to consider an
ensemble of worlds; we can do this if the theory describing this
ensemble of worlds obeys the equivalence principle. When assuming the
ASSA or RSSA, the equivalence principle holds if the theory uses
Unification and predicts the emergence of every possible observer
moment in at least one world. For example, Russell's theory of the
Everything ensemble seems to obey the equivalence principle.

I want to give a highly speculative example for the use of the
equivalence principle. Let us have a look at the two most fundamental
theories of physics, quantum mechanics (QM) and general relativity
(GR). Attempts in this list to derive QM started from knowledge states
of the observer, thus from concepts coming from the second approach,
the ensemble theory of observer moments. But I think that it is very
unlikely to get to the worldview of GR by considering the ensemble of
observer moments (if you want, I can try to explain this step in more
detail). The more promising way would be to consider the ensemble of
worlds.

The equivalence principle states that we don't contradict ourselves by
taking the two apparently different roads at the same time. But the
reconciliation of QM and GR might be as difficult as explaining the
concept of observer moments starting from a description of worlds and
vice versa. Since the last step includes (explaining observer moments
out of the ensemble of worlds) a "neurological theory", we can
speculate whether the moment is near when our revolutionary view of
the interdependence of physics and neurology/psychology is needed to
find new physics.

Youness Ayaita
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[Russell Standish-2]

On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 06:04:25AM -0700, Youness Ayaita wrote:

>
>
> The equivalence principle states that we don't contradict ourselves by
> taking the two apparently different roads at the same time. But the
> reconciliation of QM and GR might be as difficult as explaining the
> concept of observer moments starting from a description of worlds and
> vice versa. Since the last step includes (explaining observer moments
> out of the ensemble of worlds) a "neurological theory", we can
> speculate whether the moment is near when our revolutionary view of
> the interdependence of physics and neurology/psychology is needed to
> find new physics.
>

Very interesting point Youness. I'm still compiling a response to your
critique of my appendix D - it may be ready by the end of next week. I have a
conference paper due in less than two days, which is absorbing most of
my time at present.

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